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ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR: AFRICAN
INSPIRATION FOR U.S. FOIA REFORM
RICHARD J. PELTZ-STEELE*
THE Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA)1 was a landmarkglobal example of transparency, or access to information (ATI), to
ensure democratically accountable governance.  Government had grown
in the twentieth century, especially in the new administrative state, and
FOIA re-balanced the distribution of power between people and public
authority.  Today in the twenty-first century, much power in American so-
ciety has migrated from the public sector to the private sector, specifically
into the hands of corporations.  Even insofar as it works well, FOIA oper-
ates only against the conventional state by enabling an individual’s capac-
ity to realize civil and political rights.  FOIA simply was not designed to
enable the attainment of human necessities such as education and hous-
ing, much less environmental protection and healthcare, especially when
the greatest threat to those rights is not government deprivation, but the
commercial marketplace.
ATI in Africa is a different story.  Three decades after FOIA, planted
among the unprecedented ambitions of the South African constitution
was a right of ATI.2  And within that right lay an extraordinary new provi-
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1. Administrative Procedure Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3, 80 Stat. 250
(1967) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
2. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 32.
(907)
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sion.  As guaranteed by the South African constitution and enabling law, a
person may request records from a nongovernmental respondent, a pri-
vate body, if the person can show that the records are “required for the
exercise or protection of any rights.”3  In other words, South African ATI
law jettisoned the historic barrier between public and private sectors.
South African lawmakers were informed by the experience of apartheid,
in which the private sector’s complicity had been a vital and brutal partner
in state-sanctioned human rights abuse.
Blossoming beyond even the visioning of an apartheid remedy, ATI in
the private sector has been construed by the courts in a wide range of
applications, from intrafamilial business disputes to environmental conser-
vation.  South African courts have struggled to define “required” and
“rights” in applying the ATI law.  But South Africa has demonstrated that
ATI in the private sector can work.  The public-private division justifies a
change in the terms of access, but not an absolute barrier.  In the last five
years, the South African approach has been reiterated in the domestic law
of at least five other African countries and in pan-African human rights
instruments meant to inspire more domestic adoptions.
In this article, I suggest that the African example inspire U.S FOIA
reform.  In its time, FOIA has shone a light into the darkest corners of
American politics.  Now America deserves a new approach to restore
power to the people in the age of the corporation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two hundred years after the world’s first access to information (ATI)
legislation,4 the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)5 inaugurated ATI in
the modern age.  FOIA set a new global pace for best information prac-
tices.  Deriving from administrative procedural law, rather than from con-
stitutional law directly,6 FOIA expressed ATI as a right distinct from the
civil and political freedom of expression, the more familiar American
ideal.  At the same time, FOIA vitally filled in the long-blank back side of
the First Amendment coin.7  For time and experience had shown that
3. Id. art. 32(1)(b).
4. Kongl. Maj:ts Na˚dige Fo¨rordning, Anga˚ende Skrif-och Tryck-friheten
[Royal Majesty’s Gracious Ordinance, Regarding Writing and Press Freedom]
(1766) (Swed.) (commonly, “Freedom of the Press Act”), available in KARL-ERIK
TALLMO, THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW WITH SOURCE TEXTS IN
FIVE LANGUAGES (unpublished and undated book manuscript), http://www.copy
righthistory.com/swe_tf1766.html [https://perma.cc/EZ9T-GMMB]. See generally
MARIYA RIEKKINEN & MARKKU SUKSI, ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS AS A
HUMAN RIGHT 6–9 (2015), http://www.abo.fi/fakultet/media/24259/accesstoin
formationepub.pdf [Permalink unavailable] (describing content of act); David
Goldberg, From Sweden to the Global Stage: FOI as a European Human Right?, 7 J. INT’L
MEDIA & ENT. L. 1, 1–7 (2016-2017) (recounting history of Swedish law).
5. § 3, 80 Stat. 250.
6. FOIA amended the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. Id.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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even in a democracy, the freedom of expression is hollow if citizens do not
“know what their government is up to.”8  Necessarily complementary to
the freedom to speak is the need to know something to speak about.
Thus, with the advent of FOIA, two inter-dependent components of demo-
cratic governance had at last found expression in modern law.
Today the FOIA is wearing thin.  It no longer stands apart in the
world as a statement of best practices; often it is a more cautionary tale.
The point on which experts at the 2017 Norman J. Shachoy Symposium of
the Villanova Law Review seemed to agree is that FOIA, as it operates today,
is broken.  What to do about that admitted of many thought-provoking
proposals; transparency advocates’ passion inspires optimism.  But
whether FOIA can be restored to its prominence as a global leader—shin-
ing as from a lighthouse upon a hill into the darkest corners of our
world9—remains to be seen.  When one panel was pressed to offer an ulti-
mate fix for FOIA, Judicial Watch attorney Michael Bekesha suggested to
“blow it up” and start from scratch.10
In a way, I aim here to blow up FOIA.11  In the last fifty years, ATI—as
indicated by that global moniker, which did not yet exist in 1966—has
matured into a full-fledged fundamental, or human, right.  The theory be-
hind the genesis of that right, in short, posits that ATI represents a struc-
tural correction to the balance of power between people and public
institutions.  In other words, accountability is achieved through trans-
parency.  As government has grown in power and influence, especially
amid the growth of the administrative state in the twentieth century, the
law has maintained the balance of civil and political power by enlarging
the right of people and civil society organizations vis-a`-vis government.
However, in the latter decades of the twentieth century and the early
decades of the twenty-first century, another explosion in power has oc-
curred—this time, in the private sector.  A growing inequality of wealth
8. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 773 (1989) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
9. Growing up, I was inspired to pursue journalism, and later FOI/ATI in law,
by the motto and logo of my hometown Baltimore Sun newspaper, since 1840:
“Light for All.” HAROLD A. WILLIAMS, THE BALTIMORE SUN, 1837-1987, at 363
(1987); see also John Winthrop, Speech on Arbella: City Upon a Hill (1630) (tran-
script available at University of Houston, Digital History, http://www.digitalhis-
tory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=3918 [https://perma.cc/8V5B-
3YYR]) (“wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people are uppon us”);
cf. Matthew 5:14.
10. Michael Bekesha, Judicial Watch, Presentation at the Villanova Law Re-
view Norman J. Shachoy Symposium: Fifty Years Under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 1967-2017: Resolving FOIA Disputes (Oct. 20, 2017), referenced in
@RJPeltzSteele, TWITTER (Oct. 20, 2017, 2:48 PM), https://twitter.com/RJPeltz
Steele/status/921448047405608960 [https://perma.cc/B2R7-EBRC].
11. That is a metaphor. Cf. Mike Butcher, Joke About Blowing Something Up on
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and opportunity plays out across the news of the day,12 from Washington
to Davos, with troubling dimensions for race, gender, and class divisions.
Fraud in the banking sector led to a global financial crisis.  Recklessness in
industry has spoiled natural resources and poisoned human health.  The
Occupy movement and Arab Spring blended into an uneasy but persistent
global movement with a broad agenda for social and economic justice.  No
wonder that popular entertainment is replete with dystopian futures in
which corporations, not governments, are our most terrifying
oppressors.13
However effective FOIA has been in empowering people with ATI in
the public sector, the time has come for a corrective balance vis-a`-vis the
private sector.  As it happens, precisely this legal mechanism—ATI in the
private sector—exists uniquely in the continental human rights law of Af-
rica.  The African norm derives from ATI in the constitution and code of
South Africa.  The notion of ATI in the private sector was born in South
Africa especially as a response to apartheid.
As we contemplate FOIA reform in the United States, I propose the
African model of ATI in the private sector as an inspirational norm.  The
time has come for a corrective balance in the free flow of information, a
reorienting of ATI to operate horizontally, between private requester and
private respondent.  Lest we wake up soon to find that a dystopian future
vision has become our reality, we must be willing to blow up FOIA and
embrace radical proposals: here, to empower a person to make a FOIA request of
a corporation.
This article proceeds in three parts.  Part II seeks to locate ATI in the
contemporary theory of human rights law, demonstrating that the classical
distinction between public and private sector no longer has prohibitive
legitimacy in the operation of the right.  Part III examines the emergence
of ATI in the private sector in continental African legal norms, and the
experience of the South African courts in construing ATI in the private
sector since adoption of the national ATI statute.  Part IV brings this expe-
rience home to the United States to imagine the transformative impact
that ATI in the private sector could have in effecting social and economic
justice for Americans.
12. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 30–36
(Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014) (summarizing historical forces of economic
convergence and divergence, including “worrisome” stimuli of latter).
13. E.g., Incorporated (Syfy television series 2016–17); see also ELYSIUM (TriStar
Pictures et al. 2013) (depicting dramatic socio-economic disparity).  In the criti-
cally acclaimed television series Mr. Robot (USA Network television series, 2015 to
present), antagonist “E Corp” is referred to as “Evil Corp.,” an unveiled commen-
tary.  Corporate hegemony also is satirized. See, e.g., Corporate (Comedy Central
television series, 2018 to present).
4
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II. FRAMING ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS
ATI is a human right.  After World War II, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) recognized the freedom “to seek, receive and
impart information” as a component of article 19 freedom of expres-
sion.14  The language was echoed in article 19 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966, the same year the U.S.
Congress passed the FOIA.15  There is a dearth of evidence that the terms
of the UDHR were intended to create a fundamental right standing alone,
apart from the freedom of expression.  But in time, a distinct right did
emerge in the transnational legal systems of the Americas, Europe, and
Africa.  Today there remains no serious dispute that ATI has arrived on
the international human rights stage.16
Despite this conclusion, legal theorists have struggled to classify ATI
in conventional human rights frameworks.  Frameworks are merely de-
scriptive, so this difficulty does not diminish ATI’s status in human rights
law.  However, understanding the difficulty in framing ATI helps to under-
stand the difficulties inherent in its realization.  Thus, understanding the
complex nature of ATI as a human right helps to explain why the United
States has been sluggish to embrace it.  ATI’s complex nature also explains
why, even upon aggressive embrace of the constitutional and statutory
right, South Africa still struggles with implementation.17
Approaches to human rights once favored tripartite frameworks.  One
year after the ICCPR entered into force, Vasak described human rights as
arising in three generations: (1) civil and political rights, as embodied in
the ICCPR; (2) economic, social, and cultural rights, as embodied in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR);18 and (3) collective rights, also called development rights, or in
14. G.A. RES. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
15. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 & 1057 U.N.T.S. 407 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.).
16. E.g., Matilda Lasseko Phooko, An Actionable Constitutional Right of ATI, in
ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN AFRICA: LAW, CULTURE AND PRACTICE 171, 175 (Fatima
Diallo & Richard Calland eds., 2013). See generally COLIN DARCH & PETER UNDER-
WOOD, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: THE CITIZEN, THE
STATE AND MODELS OF OPENNESS 127-54 (2010) (locating ATI in human rights
framework notwithstanding admonition against “human rights inflation” without
reasoned analysis).
17. See Fola Adeleke, Constitutional Domestication of the Right of Access to Informa-
tion in Africa: Retrospect and Prospects, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN AFRICA: LAW,
CULTURE AND PRACTICE 83, 84 (Fatima Diallo & Richard Calland eds., 2013); Kris-
tina Bentley & Richard Calland, Access to Information and Socio-Economic Rights: A
Theory of Change in Practice, in SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA: SYMBOLS
OR SUBSTANCE? 341, 346 (Malcolm Langford & Ben Cousins eds., 2014).
18. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.).
5
Peltz-Steele: Access to Information in the Private Sector: African Inspiration
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
912 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 907
Vasak’s terms, “ ‘rights of solidarity.’”19  Galtung roughly correlated these
generations to colors, respectively, blue, red, and green.20  Blue rights
tend to be articulated negatively; that is, they require passive protection
from government abridgment.21  Red rights represent a significant shift
for government because they entail a positive obligation to ensure, for ex-
ample, housing, food, education, and employment.22  Vasak described
third-generation rights, green rights, to “include the right to development,
the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the right to
peace, and the right to ownership of the common heritage of mankind.”23
Green rights are the most difficult to attain, because “they can only be
implemented by the combined efforts of everyone: individuals, states and
other bodies, as well as public and private institutions.”24  Salient in our era
of climate change, a clean environment, safe for human health, is a green
right.25
The United States is good at blue rights.  The 1791 Bill of Rights pro-
vided landmark protection for civil and political rights, mostly stated in
the negative, such as the First Amendment’s negative prohibition on gov-
ernment interference with freedom of religion and speech.26
The United States is not good at red rights.  President Franklin
Roosevelt’s initiative to move the country in that direction27 went no-
where, defeated in part ideologically, by America’s social and economic
libertarian ethos.28  This stalled progression is not universal.  The 1996
South Africa Constitution is famously expansive for its provision of red
rights, though visiting a few South African townships readily proves that
the promise is greater than the delivery.  The effort to realize red rights,
such as adequate housing, has required progressive implementation,
ongoing judicial supervision, and recognition of limited justiciability.
Green rights also can be found in the South African Constitution, though
tend even more to a purely aspirational nature.
19. Karel Vasak, A 30-Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNESCO COURIER (Nov. 1977), at 29.
20. JOHAN GALTUNG, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ANOTHER KEY 154–56 (1994).  Galtung
also described “Colored,” or “non-white,” to represent a non-Western perspec-
tive—a laudable aim if unfortunate choice of term. Id.
21. Vasak, supra note 19, at 29.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Galtung, supra note 20, at 156.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law abridging . . . .”).
27. Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to Congress (Jan. 11,
1944) (transcript available at Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Mu-
seum, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/address_text.html [https://per
ma.cc/7UGC-SX73]).
28. I intimate no normative judgment.  As a libertarian, I admit circumspec-
tion of government power in the attainment of red rights, but conclude that the
equation is not all or nothing.
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These tripartite human rights frameworks have been criticized aptly
as overly simplistic.29  Vasak stated no time frames, and the concept of
“generations” mistakenly suggests a unidirectional evolutionary process
over time.30  The reality is more complex.  An advocate for red rights, for
example, can declare credibly that food and shelter are higher priorities
for people than electoral advocacy.31  Blue rights might have been the
principal concern of the First Congress of the United States because the
privileged political class already had food and shelter.  Such is not always
the order of things.  Meanwhile the Declaration of Independence might
be said to have pitched its opening gambit in the key of green rights, con-
cerned as it was with the collective right of self-determination.32
Attempting to locate ATI furthermore belies the tripartite frame-
work.33  Certainly ATI, as effected in FOIA, may be regarded as a blue
right.  One must know what the government is up to in order to be an
informed elector and speaker on public affairs.34  But the free flow of in-
formation does more than that.  Vasak recognized that the freedom of
information was vital to the mission of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization to facilitate education and cultural
exchange.35  The freedom of information is also vital to environmental
advocacy.  In this vein, ATI is central to an array of international instru-
ments in environmental law, including the Rio Declaration,36 the Aarhus
Convention,37 and the Cartagena Protocol.38
29. E.g., Steven L.B. Jensen, Putting to Rest the Three Generations Theory of




31. See Galtung, supra note 20, at 154–55.
32. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).
33. See Adeleke, supra note 17, at 84 (citing recognition of ATI alternatively as
civil-political right and as socio-economic right).
34. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
35. Vasak, supra note 19, at 32; see also Yvonne Donders, International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Accessibility and the Right to Information, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION: CRITICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES 102–14 (Tarlach McGonagle & Yvonne Donders eds., 2015) (describing in-
terplay of ICESCR and ATI in international law).
36. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), United Nations Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, princ. 10, (June 13, 1992), http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm [https://perma.cc/V5W9-
VGJP] (requiring public access to information about hazardous materials and op-
portunity to participate in policymaking).
37. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M.
517 (entered into force Oct. 30, 2001) (granting public broad rights of access to
information about environment and recourse to courts).
38. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
art. 20, 23, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208 (entered into force Sept. 11, 2003)
(creating information clearinghouse for information about safety of genetically
7
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Ultimately, a better understanding of ATI emerges from an older, al-
ternative framework of human rights that describes ATI as power.  In a
1919 treatment, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld described human rights as
claims, liberties, powers, and immunities.39  Still, the classification of ATI
in this framework is variable.  A request for information under a freedom
of information act, subject to judicial enforcement, manifests as a claim.40
But increasingly, scholars, such as Darch and Underwood,41 have focused
on ATI as power.  When ATI is understood as effecting power, it is well
described as “an enabler right.”42  Viewed with this approach, ATI is not a
human right per se; rather, ATI is a human right when it serves to facilitate
the realization of another human right, whether blue, red, or green.
Two inquisitors in particular, Roberts and Calland, have championed
ATI as power en route to explaining the role for ATI in the private sector.
Though not unique in its conclusion,43 Roberts’s 2001 treatment of struc-
tural pluralism44 is the seminal work outside of South Africa concerning
ATI and the private sector.  By “structural pluralism,” Roberts referred to
the late twentieth-century restructuring of the public sector, especially in
the United States and Commonwealth countries, to deliver services from a
modified organisms, and requiring dissemination of information to public to in-
form policymaking).
39. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS AP-
PLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 5 (1920); Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J.
710, 710 (1917).
40. Adeleke, supra note 1733, at 85.
41. Darch & Underwood, supra note 16, at 140–41.  I oversimplify the picture
here, because I do not think ATI as a human right remains a proposition in serious
contention, human-rights-inflation objections notwithstanding.  Aptly, Darch, and
Underwood described rights in interactive relationships among their Hohfeldian
capacities, diagrammable like molecules in biochemistry, and they endeavored to
depict ATI. Id. at 139, 141.
42. Article 19, Open Development: Access to Information and the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals 9 (July 2017), https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/388
32/Open-Development—Access-to-Information-and-the-SDGs-2017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z4AC-9J5X]; see also UNESCO, KEYSTONES TO FOSTER INCLUSIVE KNOWL-
EDGE SOCIETIES: ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION,
PRIVACY, AND ETHICS ON A GLOBAL INTERNET: FINAL STUDY 29 (2015), http://unes
doc.unesco.org/images/0023/002325/232563E.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL5W-
JXCL] (“UNESCO has also long emphasized access to information and knowledge
as enablers for the right to education and development.”).
43. See Mazhar Siraj, Exclusion of Private Sector from Freedom of Information Laws:
Implications from a Human Rights Perspective, 2 J. ALT. PERSP. SOC. SCI. 211, 215
(2010) (citing HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLITICS (Tim Dunne & Nicholas J.
Wheeler eds., 1999); INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COM-
PANIES (2002); JANET DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1995); TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Jedrzej George Frynas
& Scott Pegg eds., 2003)).
44. Alasdair Roberts, Structural Pluralism and the Right to Information, 51 U. TO-
RONTO L.J. 243 (2001).  The timing of this article in 2001 was auspicious. See infra
note 326 and accompanying text.
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broad range of private entities and public-private hybrids.45  This privatiza-
tion movement followed the earlier twentieth-century birth and rapid
growth of the administrative state, the “fourth branch of government” in
the United States.  Because these changes shifted public power from
elected office to the civil bureaucracy, they necessarily represented a dimi-
nution in public accountability through the traditional means of the ballot
box.  As a result, power in society shifted in favor of governors, at the ex-
pense of the governed.
Roberts termed this twentieth-century power shift, from people to
government, a “democratic deficit.”46  Bentley and Calland identified a
corresponding shift in information flow, placing more information in the
hands of government than in the hands of the electorate.47  They termed
the resulting deficit “information poverty.”48  ATI laws, such as FOIA,
came on the scene as a corrective for the democratic deficit and resulting
information poverty.  Calland described ATI in this sense as “recon-
figur[ing] venerable information asymmetries between state and citi-
zen.”49  Through transparency, an ATI law restores information flow to
the people, thereby bolstering accountability of the formerly opaque gov-
ernment.  FOIA was designed to facilitate—to enable, or re-enable—the
exercise of civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.  It was
natural for the 1966 FOIA to be born as an amendment to the 1946 Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA),50 because procedural due process was
the APA’s broader purpose.
The latter-twentieth-century privatization movement revived the
problems of democratic deficit and information poverty, because again,
power was moved away from the accountable offices of government.  But
on this occasion, ATI reform did not ensue.  In the United States, priva-
tization was an especial aim of reformers with regard to red rights, or so-
cial welfare services, such as health, housing, and infrastructure;51
American foreign development policy correspondingly counseled priva-
tization of health, education, and water services.52  FOIA, born to redress
45. Id. at 245–55.
46. Id. at 269.
47. Bentley & Calland, supra note 17, at 341.
48. Id.
49. Richard Calland, Exploring the Liberal Genealogy and the Changing Praxis of
the Right of Access to Information: Towards an Egalitarian Realisation, 61 THEORIA 70, 71
(2014).
50. See supra note 6.
51. E.g., Marc Bendick, Jr., Privatizing the Delivery of Social Welfare Services: An
Idea to Be Taken Seriously, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE 97, 97–98
(Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds., 1989) (“America has always been a
reluctant welfare state.”); Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn, Introduction: Priva-
tization in Context, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE 3, 4 (Sheila B.
Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds., 1989).
52. Santosh Mehrotra & Enrique Delamonica, The Private Sector and Privatiza-
tion in Social Services: Is the Washington Consensus “Dead”?, 5 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 141,
142–43 (2005) (describing policy of 1980s and 1990s).
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information poverty by facilitating the exercise of blue rights, was not per-
ceived as a natural agent to facilitate the realization of red rights, much
less green rights.  But understood through the lens of ATI as power, it
stands to reason that ATI is equally useful to enable red rights by facilitat-
ing the attainment of social services.53  From the perspective of the person
in need, it matters not whether the depriver or the provider is public,
private, or a hybrid of both.  The information poverty is the same, and ATI
can be an equally potent corrective.  Socio-economic freedom is especially
vulnerable to monopolistic or oligopolistic power in access to services,
from the most basic necessities to transportation and telecommunication,
because consumers’ market choices are reduced to few or none.54
Roberts argued that the public-private distinction ought to be jet-
tisoned to reestablish a balance between the powerless and the powerful.
Calland similarly described ATI as a vehicle to “escape legal formalism,”
indeed to escape ATI’s own “liberal genealogy,” an origin as subsidiary of
civil and political rights in the UDHR and ICCPR.55  According to Bentley
and Calland, the very term “ATI,” as adopted in South Africa and Canada,
is better indicative of a deliberate corrective to the power dynamic than
the passive and dubious “freedom of information” in the U.S. tradition.56
ATI in the form of FOIA in the United States was an “ad hoc solution”
amidst the civil rights struggle, not a panacea for information poverty.57
Worse, the U.S. FOIA has been perverted to corporate use and objectives
at the public expense58—a worsening problem, Professor Margaret Kwoka
demonstrated in this symposium.59
Calland saw ATI as having the potential to “transmogrify” from a
shield against government power to a sword in the attainment of egalitari-
anism, empowerment of the disadvantaged, and improvement of living
conditions.60  Those aims require ATI to work against public and private
53. Bentley & Calland, supra note 17, at 346–47; Calland, supra note 49, at 71.
54. Richard Mulgan, Comparing Accountability in the Public and Private Sectors, 59
AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 87, 88 (2000); see also Peter Johan Lor & Johannes Jacobus
Britz, Is a Knowledge Society Possible Without Freedom of Access to Information?, 33 J.
INFO. SCI. 387, 388 (positing right of ATI as prerequisite to infrastructure develop-
ment in information and communication technology); cf. infra note 261.
55. Calland, supra note 49, at 72–73, 85.
56. Bentley & Calland, supra note 17, at 344; cf. CORY DOCTOROW, INFORMA-
TION DOESN’T WANT TO BE FREE: LAWS FOR THE INTERNET AGE, 118–19 (2014)
(challenging notion that copyright protection furthers human rights).
57. Calland, supra note 49, at 73–74.
58. Id. at 75.
59. Margaret Kwoka, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Presentation
at the Villanova Law Review Norman J. Shachoy Symposium: Fifty Years Under the
Freedom of Information Act, 1967-2017: The “On the Ground” Operation of FOIA
(Oct. 20, 2017); see also Margaret Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1414–26
(2015) (describing how corporate use of FOIA undermines its public-interest
aims).
60. Calland, supra note 49, at 78, 84.
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power alike.61  Anyway, Calland reasoned, even economic libertarians
must acknowledge that free markets require a free flow of information.62
In other words, ATI is an antidote to social and economic disparity—
whether the perpetuation of poverty and privilege in South Africa,63 or
the rocketing hegemony of “the one percent” in America.
Roberts painstakingly cataloged how common law countries circum-
scribe ATI law by broadening definitions of public sector to include the
“grey zone” of the quasi-public sector, defined by public function, fund-
ing, or power.64  He found those approaches wanting and so searched for
a principle other than the outmoded distinction between public and pri-
vate sectors to define the appropriate scope of ATI.  If ATI is a human
right—its recognition as such was dawning in 2001—then, Roberts rea-
soned, the controlling principle should be the collateral fundamental
right that ATI enables65—whether blue, red, or green.  When the collat-
eral human right at stake reaches a requisite threshold of necessity, then
ATI should be the overriding policy imperative.  Roberts quoted Hunt:
“The very existence of institutional power capable of affecting rights and
interests should itself be sufficient reason for subjecting exercises of that
power to the supervisory jurisdiction of the [courts]”66—regardless of
whether the institutional power rests in the public or private sector, or
somewhere in between.
Calland and Roberts are not alone; they sing in a chorus of voices that
recognize the potential excess of power in the private sector today, and
the need to protect human rights horizontally in response.  The Interna-
tional Council on Human Rights cataloged the human rights at stake in
private sector activity as much as in public sector activity.67  The list in-
cludes rights of every “color,” from freedoms of religion and expression;
to access to education, healthcare, food, and housing; to guarantees of
environmental protection, integrity of indigenous identity, and peace.68
61. Id. at 72.
62. Id. at 76.
63. See Bentley & Calland, supra note 17, at 341.
64. Roberts, supra note 44, at 252–55.
65. Id. at 256–59.
66. Id. at 255 (quoting Murray Hunt, Constitutionalism and Contractualisation of
Government, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 21, 33 (Michael Taggart ed.,
1997)).
67. Siraj, supra note 43, at 215–16. (citing INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES (2002), http://www.ichrp.org/files/summaries/7/
107_summary_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MWD-ZAVG]).
68. INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES (2002),
http://www.ichrp.org/files/summaries/7/107_summary_en.pdf [https://perma
.cc/2MWD-ZAVG]).  Besides ATI per se, the full catalog comprises life and liberty;
no forced labor; non-discrimination; gender equality; civic freedoms, including ex-
pression, religion, and privacy; employment rights, including collective bargaining,
workplace safety, and non-discrimination; economic and social rights, including
11
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Watchdog organization Transparency International (TI) added transna-
tional companies’ potential to melt down the world economy to its list of
already good reasons, such as corruption and money laundering, to worry
about corporate accountability.69  In 2012, TI published best practices in
corporate transparency, which include country-by-country reporting of
corporate holdings and basic financial data, including capital expendi-
tures, revenues, taxes, and giving.70  TI recognized affirmative disclosure
regimes in extractive industries71 and the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act72—which
U.S. House Republicans sought to roll back in 201773—as steps in the
education, health, food, and housing; environmental integrity; protection of chil-
dren; indigenous and minority group rights, including non-exploitation; justice,
including access to courts, redress for victims, and punishment of perpetrators;
protections against war, including humane treatment, limited arms trade, and no
involuntary relocation. Id.
69. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, TRANSPARENCY IN CORPORATE REPORTING: ASSESSING
THE WORLD’S LARGEST COMPANIES 4 (2012); see also George Monbiot, A Monstrous
Proposal, MONBIOT.COM (May 7, 2012), http://www.monbiot.com/2012/05/07/a-
monstrous-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/ATV7-NDWY] (calling for extension of
U.K. ATI law to private sector after financial bailouts, and comparing U.K. ATI law
with South Africa’s); Siraj, supra note 43, at 219–20; Banking Scandal Exposes Weak
Corporate Governance, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.transparen
cy.org.uk/press-releases/banking-scandal-exposes-weak-corporate-governance/#
.Wlo0BDdG02w [https://perma.cc/2EX3-4NZ3] (describing manipulation of
benchmark loan interest rate by Barclays Bank personnel); Three Steps to Stop Secret
Companies, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.transparency.org/
news/feature/3_steps_to_stop_secret_companies [https://perma.cc/AM6X-
8SWV].  I exclude from the scope of this research the growing body of work on the
corporate social responsibility movement, or business and human rights, but note
that the existence of the movement infers an understanding of excess in corporate
power vis-a`-vis the rights of persons. See generally KPMG, THE ROAD AHEAD: KPMG
SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2017, at 4–5 (2017), https://
home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/campaigns/csr/pdf/CSR_Reporting_2017
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TKN-YRMA] (summarizing trends in corporate social
responsibility).
70. Transparency in Corporate Reporting, supra note 69, at 9, 29, 42; see also
European Parliament Committee Sets the Tone for Europe’s Debate on Multinational Trans-
parency, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (May 7, 2015), https://www.transparency.org/news/
pressrelease/european_parliament_committee_sets_the_tone_for_europes_de
bate_on_multinati [https://perma.cc/MA99-VPXC] (describing support for coun-
try-by-country reporting initiatives within European Parliament).
71. The archetype of transnational voluntary compliance regimes is the Ex-
tractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which originated in 2002. See, e.g., An-
dre´s Mejı´a Acosta, Impact and Effectiveness of Accountability and Transparency
Initiatives: The Governance of Natural Resources, 31 DEV. POL’Y REV. S89, S92–S93
(2013).
72. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376.  Dodd-Frank built upon a U.S. corporate dis-
closure tradition dating to 1911 and amped up after the Great Depression.  Siraj,
supra note 43, at 218-19.  Siraj recalled that Louis Brandeis’s famous quote, “sun-
light is said to be the best of disinfectants,” was published in Other People’s Money—
and How Bankers Use It in 1914.  Siraj, supra note 43, at 218.
73. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (intro-
duced Apr. 26, 2017).
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right direction.  TI called for a comprehensive disclosure regime for all
multinational corporations, rather than a sectoral approach.74
Pondering ATI in the private sector in 2010, Siraj examined the litera-
ture and opined that mushrooming transparency initiatives, compulsory
and voluntary, were not stopping abuses of individual rights.75  According
to Siraj, privatization, deregulation, and globalization are driving data into
the private sector hands of banks, telecommunication firms, hospitals, and
educational institutions faster than the law can keep up.76  Chirwa rea-
soned even earlier, in 2004:
[I]t has become increasingly clear that state action alone is not
sufficient to guarantee the enjoyment of human rights.  For ex-
ample, access to essential medicine is not only dependent on the
policies and actions of the state but also on the decisions and
policies of pharmaceutical corporations.  Banks and other finan-
cial institutions play a critical role in ensuring access to housing.
With increasing privatisation, access to such basic services as
water, health, education and electricity is also dependent on the
actions and policies of private service providers.77
That private actors can abuse human rights is “emphatically so at the
global level,” where transnational companies dwarf governments in re-
sources and dominate them in power.78  Toby Mendel in 2008, writing for
UNESCO, advocated for ATI in the private sector as a construction of
UDHR Article 19 in recognition of private bodies’ influence over “key
public interests, such as environment and health.”79
Yet even as ATI laws reach out to private bodies through procurement
processes, sectoral regulatory regimes, and privatized public services, ATI
74. Transparency in Corporate Reporting, supra note 69, at 43.
75. Siraj, supra note 43, at 223.
76. Id. at 222; see also Grahame M. Morris, Motion for Bill 109, Freedom of Infor-
mation (Private Healthcare Companies), GRAHAME MORRIS MP (Oct. 9, 2013), http://
grahamemorrismp.co.uk/?p=2787 [https://perma.cc/U5UJ-MN76] (in moving
bill to extend ATI law in public contracting, observing recent fraud on taxpayers by
security contractors of more than £50 million, and recent fine for fraud by U.S.
regulators of global healthcare provider of more than $2 billion).  Making a curi-
ous access argument based on institutional equity, Yo Zushi posited that public
institutions of higher education in the United Kingdom get a bad rap because
reports of sexual harassment are subject to public scrutiny, giving an appearance
of higher incidence than in private educational settings, where they are not.  Yo
Zushi, Are Freedom of Information Requests Poisoning Us Against the Public Sector?, NEW
STATESMAN (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.newstatesman.com/2017/03/foi-culture-
public-sector-sexual-harrassment-universities [https://perma.cc/J44F-454F].
77. Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, The Doctrine of State Responsibility as a Potential
Means of Holding Private Actors Accountable for Human Rights, 5 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L.
1, 2 (2004).
78. Patrick Birkinshaw, Commentary, Freedom of Information and Openness: Fun-
damental Human Rights?, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 215–16 (2006).
79. TOBY MENDEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY
32 (2d rev. & upd. ed. 2008).
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has remained tied to the distinction between public and private.80  The
U.S. Congress entertains perennial bills aimed at access to privatized pris-
ons—an example Roberts offered as urgent paradigm more than fifteen
years ago81—but has passed none.82  England, Australia, and Scotland
have flirted with expansions aiming at the private sector, each on multiple
occasions in recent decades and in recent years.83  No Western country
80. Siraj, supra note 43, at 223.
81. Roberts, supra note 44, at 265–69.
82. E.g., Lauren-Brooke “L.B.” Eisen, Private Prisons Lock Up Thousands of Amer-
icans with Almost No Oversight, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://
www.brennancenter.org/analysis/private-prisons-lock-thousands-americans-almost-
no-oversight [https://perma.cc/U2QU-QVDW]; Alex Park, Will Private Prisons Fi-
nally Be Subject to the Freedom of Information Act?, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 16, 2014),
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2014/12/will-private-prisons-ever-
be-subject-open-records-laws/# [https://perma.cc/3VAB-HXBZ].
83. E.g., Tom Brake, The FOIA Has Just One Problem: It Doesn’t Go Far Enough,
NEW STATESMAN (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/stag-
gers/2016/01/freedom-information-act-has-just-one-problem-it-doesnt-go-far-
enough [https://perma.cc/797F-R3MG] (calling for legislation to extend ATI law
to security contractors, train service providers, hospitals, and any “social enterprise
or charity carrying out public sector work”); Australian Law Reform Comm’n, Free-
dom of Information Act 1982—Open Government, AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N,
https://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/freedom-information-act-1982-open-govern-
ment (last modified Sept. 30, 2015) [https://perma.cc/5C6F-LY8F] (describing
multiple considerations and rejections of private-sector expansion in Australia ATI
law); Peter Hall & Kirsten Whitfield, Freedom of Informatio—Application to Private
Businesses Providing Public Services, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.lexology
.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5271f213-2291-41ec-85ee-08a3f0fc1e03 [https://per
ma.cc/W3M6-UAVB] (describing “sigh of relief” in private sector after government
decision to focus on contractual transparency rather than further ATI expansion
to ensure public contractor accountability); Rachel Morrison, Extending Freedom of
Information to the Private Sector, CMS LAW-NOW (June 16, 2016), http://www.cms-
lawnow.com/ealerts/2016/06/extending-freedom-of-information-to-the-private-
sector [https://perma.cc/BR28-NKZM] (describing 2013 administrative order
that brought recreational, cultural, and sporting trusts within reach of Scotland
ATI law, and proposal to extend reach farther, to schools and prisons); PA Media
Lawyer, Labour Vows to Extend Freedom of Information Act to Cover Private Sector, PRESS-
GAZETTE (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/labour-vows-extend-free-
dom-information-act-cover-private-sector/ [https://perma.cc/KL5D-RZ6D] (dis-
cussing party pledge to extend ATI law to private contractors operating prisons,
education, and health services); Practice Notes, Freedom of Information, PRACTICAL L.,
UK Practice Note No. 0-200-9452, at 36 (Thomson Reuters 2017) (discussing possi-
bility that Ministry of Justice would extend ATI law to private companies with “‘ef-
fective monopolies’ over public services (such as water and energy companies”);
SCOTTISH GOV’T, EXTENDING COVERAGE OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION (SCOT-
LAND) ACT 2002—BUSINESS AND REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, Jan. 11, 2016,
§ 4, http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0049/00492105.pdf [Permalink unavailable]
(considering options to extend ATI law to schools, health services, prisons, or enti-
ties serving “functions of a public nature”); William Turvill, FOIA Should Apply to
Private Firms Carrying Out Public Sector Work Valued at £5m or More, Report Suggests,
CITY AM (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.cityam.com/235719/freedom-of-information-
act-should-apply-to-private-firms-carrying-out-public-sector-work-valued-at-5m-or-
more-report-suggests [https://perma.cc/A8XW-WXUT] (describing conclusion of
independent commission that ATI law should be extended to public contractors in
14
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has made the leap cross-sectorally beyond the public-private divide.  In this
respect, post-apartheid South Africa stepped out alone.
III. ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN AFRICA
Transparency in the private sector is not new.  Access to information
is afforded by legislation in certain economic sectors as a feature of regula-
tory oversight.  ATI laws across the globe afford varying levels of access to
information in the private sector via government procurement processes
and contract supervision.  ATI laws also variably authorize access to infor-
mation in the hands of quasi-public bodies, including all manner of pub-
lic-private hybrids.  These many modes of ATI vis-a`-vis the private sector
are not the focus of this article, but it is important to recognize that they
exist.  These modes of access recognize that power has been relocated in
private bodies, away from purely public bodies and so away from existing
channels of accountability.  Access restores the balance by drawing these
private bodies back into the accountability orbit.
The focus of this article is the right of ATI in the purely private sector.
This right of ATI developed uniquely in post-apartheid South Africa84 and
is now taking shape on the African continent.  Exercised horizontally, this
right compels a private actor to positive action in responding to a request
under access law.85  Once triggered upon certain threshold conditions,
and cross-sectoral in scope, this right of ATI proceeds to override “the
classical liberal insistence on differential treatment of the public and pri-
vate.”86  In Roberts’s terms, genuine access to the private sector requires
limited fashion, balancing public accountability with cost burden borne indirectly
by taxpayers).
84. Roberts, supra note 44, at 252.
85. Beyond the scope of this article, rights of personal access and correction
that have come to be norms—and indeed, human rights—of European data pro-
tection law overlap with ATI in practice, but differ qualitatively.  Data protection
rights are limited to a person’s access to her or his own information and predi-
cated on fundamental rights of personal privacy and personal integrity. See gener-
ally Richard J. Peltz-Steele, Mind the Gap: Understanding the U.S. Perspective on Privacy
in Safe Harbor/Data Transfer Negotiations, in ENJEUX EUROPE´ENS ET MONDIAUX DE LA
PROTECTION DES DONNE´ES PERSONNELLES annex., at 165-69 (Alain Grosjean ed.,
2015) (describing evolving American perspective on data protection); Richard J.
Peltz-Steele, The Pond Betwixt: Differences in the US-EU Data Protection/Safe Harbor Ne-
gotiation, 19 J. INTERNET L. 1, 17–20 (2015) (describing data protection equivalents
in U.S. law).  The right of ATI in the private sector conceptualized by Calland and
Roberts is motivated by the protection of rights, which may include personal pri-
vacy.  But ATI is grounded broadly in public interest and derived from the family
of expressive freedoms in the tradition of Emerson’s First Amendment theory. See
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
878–79 (1963) (describing rationales: social, including political, decision-making;
“individual self-fulfillment”; ascertainment of truth; and the social “balance be-
tween stability and change”).
86. Roberts, supra note 44, at 244; see also Mulgan, supra note 54, at 87, 96
(recognizing threat to freedom in private power irrespective of classical liberal
paradigm).
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the “piercing of corporate privacy,”87 or an invasion of economic liberty.88
This vein of ATI originated uniquely as a product of the South African
experience.  The following part A describes the development of ATI rights
in South Africa and on the continent, and part B recounts South African
courts’ experience construing ATI in the private sector.
A. Access to Information After Apartheid
Secrecy was a weapon of the apartheid regime in South Africa.89  In
reaction, transparency and accountability were clarion demands of re-
formers when the regime crumbled in 1991.90  Private actors had played a
key role in perpetuating oppression and abuse during apartheid.  So legal
reformers set their sights on the rights of individuals vis-a`-vis both public
and private sectors, i.e., in the human rights vernacular, both vertically
and horizontally.91  Cognizant of recent apartheid and a government cam-
paign of privatization already underway, representatives of the African Na-
tional Congress and constitutional assembly were willing to disregard the
classical public-private distinction92 with a verve that was lacking in the
U.S. Reconstruction.93  By way of comparison, the 1875 Civil Rights Act
and 1883 Civil Rights Cases, and the famous dissent of Justice Harlan, were
concerned with “inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and
other places of public amusement”—to wit, housing, transportation, cul-
ture, and sport.94  So for Reconstruction, horizontal civil rights was the
path not taken.
87. Roberts, supra note 44, at 251.
88. Roberts authored his treatment of structural pluralism, supra note 44, in
the early years of personal privacy and data protection law and well before the
debate over corporate personhood exploded with Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310 (2010).  It is doubtful he intended to take sides in the later debate, so “corpo-
rate privacy” might have been an unfortunate choice of words.
89. Richard Calland, Illuminating the Politics and Practice of Access to Information
in South Africa, in PAPER WARS: ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 1, 2–4
(Kate Allan ed., 2009), http://foip.saha.org.za/static/paper-wars-access-to-infor-
mation-in-south-africa [https://perma.cc/FMX4-4KZE]; Darch & Underwood,
supra note 16, at 233–35 (describing surveillance machinery that “underpinned
every aspect of the functioning of the apartheid state,” and destruction of records
to conceal abuse).
90. Calland, supra note 89, at 4–5; Dan Ngabirano, The Uganda Freedom of Infor-
mation Campaign: Stuck in the Mud?, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN AFRICA: LAW,
CULTURE AND PRACTICE 191, 208–09 (Fatima Diallo & Richard Calland, eds. 2013).
91. See generally Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights Beyond the Public-Pri-
vate Law Divide, in SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA: SYMBOLS OR SUB-
STANCE? 63, 66–72 (Malcolm Langford & Ben Cousins eds., 2014) (describing
extension of human rights from vertical to horizontal application through South
Africa constitutional process).
92. Adeleke, supra note 17, at 89.
93. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883) (construing amends. XIII-XIV
of the U.S. Constitution).
94. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9, 37 (majority opinion and dissent of
Harlan, J.) (quoting and citing the Civil Rights Act of 1875, § 1).
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Post-apartheid law recognized ATI explicitly.  The 1993 interim con-
stitution vested in “[e]very person . . . the right of access to all information
held by the state or any of its organs at any level of government,” but only
“in so far as such information is required for the exercise or protection of
any of his or her rights.”95  The interim constitution marked a significant
departure from opaque oppression, but the rights-required language, a
precondition to all access, was still cautious relative to global ATI norms.96
The government in 1994 appointed a team to develop enabling legisla-
tion, which fed into the negotiation for a permanent constitution.97
The permanent 1996 constitution further liberalized access.  Moving
the rights-required qualifier, article 32 of the constitution declared,
“(1) Everyone has the right of access to—(a) any information held by the
state; and (b) any information that is held by another person and that is
required for the exercise or protection of any rights.”98  A second para-
graph required implementing legislation “to give effect to this right,” al-
lowing “for reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and
financial burden on the state.”99  Article 32 thus contemplated a ground-
breaking horizontal right of ATI.100
While the dismantling of apartheid laid essential groundwork, many
factors influenced the advent of horizontal ATI.  The European Data Pro-
tection Directive was adopted in 1995 and advanced the notion that per-
sonal privacy justified a horizontal imposition of rights against the private
sector for access to a requester’s personally identifying information.101
European advisers playing a part in the development of the new South
African constitution imported that idea;102 extrapolation to the protection
of human rights beyond privacy was not a great leap.
95. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, art. 23.
96. Kate O’Regan, Democracy and Access to Information in the South Africa
Constitution: Some Reflections, Address at The Constitutional Right of Access to
Information Conference (Sept, 4, 2000), in THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO INFORMATION 11, 11, 12, (2000), http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_4936-1522-2-
30.pdf?040625152235 [https://perma.cc/CPY6-WJ6T].
97. Ngabirano, supra note 90, at 209.
98. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 32(1).
99. Id. art. 32(2).
100. See, e.g., Sebastian Roling, Transparency & Access to Information in
South Africa: An Evaluation of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of
2000, 1, 3 (2007) (unpublished LL.M. dissertation, University of Cape Town),
http://www.publiclaw.uct.ac.za/usr/public_law/LLMPapers/roling.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XMT3-CENF] (“Shaken by the experiences of iron-tight secrecy during
Apartheid, South Africa decided to make the society transparent in large leaps.”
(footnotes omitted)).
101. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31; see
supra note 85.
102. See, e.g., Michael Lange, Welcoming Remarks (Sept. 4, 2000), in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION, 7, 7–8, (2000), http://www.kas
.de/wf/doc/kas_4936-1522-2-30.pdf?040625152235 [https://perma.cc/W3RW-34
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At the same time, expanded ATI in the new South African constitu-
tion cannot be viewed apart from the document’s commitment to socio-
economic rights, unprecedented in the global history of constitutional
law.  While the justiciability of those rights remained to be determined,
ATI was recognized for its capacity to enable rights to housing, healthcare,
food, water, social security, education,103 and anti-discrimination, as well
as the possibility of land restitution104 and the collective right to a clean
environment.105  Responsive to apartheid, ATI enabled constitutional fair-
ness in the administrative process.106  Constitutionalizing ATI meant that
legislative limits on access—even for the legitimate aims of privacy, confi-
dentiality, national security, and law enforcement—would be constrained
by necessity and proportionality, with the burden on the government to
justify the exemption.107  With human rights as the firm foundation for
ATI, application regardless of the public or private nature of the respond-
ing entity made sound public policy sense, despite the departure from for-
eign models.108  According to Calland, “the extension of the right of ATI
to privately held information was a groundbreaking and arguably radical
broadening of the scope of the right—a crossing, so to speak, of a legal
and political rubicon.”109
The constitutionally required implementing legislation took shape in
the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000 (PAIA).110  PAIA op-
erationally superseded ATI claims under the 1996 constitution.111
Though influenced by ATI laws in the common law cohort of Australia,
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United States,112 PAIA marked a
TB] (describing influence of German political organization Konrad Adenauer
Foundation, conference sponsor, on South African constitutional process, in-
formed by data protection law).
103. O’Regan, supra note 96, at 14.
104. Michael Asimow, Administrative Law Under South Africa’s Interim Constitu-
tion, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 393, 394 (1996).
105. OPEN DEMOCRACY ADVICE CTR., RIGHT TO ACCESS INFORMATION TRAINING
MANUAL 14 (2011), http://www.r2k.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/rti-train
ing-manual-dec-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K6C-JE62] (emphasizing “adequate
health care, education and clean environment”).
106. Asimow, supra note 104, at 395; Calland, supra note 89, at 6; O’Regan,
supra note 96, at 14.
107. O’Regan, supra note 96, at 13, 15; see Promotion of Access to Information
Act 2 of 2000 § 9(b) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter PAIA].
108. Jonathan Klaaren, Iain Currie & Andrew Smith, Analysing Foreign Ac-
cess to Information Legislation from a South African Viewpoint, Address at The
Constitutional Right of Access to Information Conference (Sept, 4, 2000), in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION, 29, 30 (2000), http://www.kas
.de/wf/doc/kas_4936-1522-2-30.pdf?040625152235 [https://perma.cc/W3RW-34
TB].
109. Calland, supra note 49, at 79.
110. PAIA, § 9(b) (S. Afr.).
111. Inst. for Democracy in S. Afr. v. Afr. Nat’l Cong. 2005 (5) SA 39 (C), at
para. 14–19 (S. Afr.).
112. Roling, supra note 100, at 10.
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significant departure by effecting the constitutional guarantee of direct
access to the private sector.113  PAIA echoes  the constitution, reaching
both state information holdings and “any information that is held by an-
other person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any
rights.”114  Public bodies include quasi-public entities through a disjunc-
tive power or function test.115  Defining a “private body,” PAIA includes
natural persons and partnerships, insofar as they are engaged in “any
trade, business or profession,” and “any former or existing juristic
person.”116
PAIA spells out procedures for access to private bodies apart from
access to public bodies, though the provisions play out in parallel.  PAIA
puts the onus on the requester “to identify the right the requester is seek-
ing to exercise or protect and provide an explanation of why the re-
quested record is required for the exercise or protection of that right.”117
Public bodies acting in the public interest may assert private persons’
rights and act as requesters.118
A private body under PAIA affirmatively must compile and maintain
an access manual that lists contact information and describes categories of
information already publicly available, information available through
other legislation, and a “description of the subjects on which the body
holds records and the categories of records held on each subject.”119
PAIA authorizes denial of access by private respondents upon grounds120
that track those that pertain to public bodies121 and include the privacy of
a third-party natural person,122 trade secrets and commercially sensitive
113. Yvonne Burns, Introduction, (Sept. 4, 2000), in THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION, 5, 5 (2000), http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_49
36-1522-2-30.pdf?040625152235 [https://perma.cc/W3RW-34TB].
114. PAIA, § 9(a) (S. Afr.).
115. Id. § 1 (“public body”).
116. Id. (“private body”).
117. Id. § 53(1)(d).  Requesters may seek personal data, as in the data protec-
tion vein, id. § 50(3), but PAIA requests are not constrained by any requirement of
personal identification.  Under the PAIA, a form request published by the South
African History Archive, “Form C,” invites the user to “indicate which right is to be
exercised or protected,” and then “[e]xplain why the record requested is required
for the exercise or protection of the aforementioned right.”  South Africa Histori-
cal Archive, PAIA Resource Kit, at 4, http://foip.saha.org.za/uploads/images/
PAIA_Resource_Kit%20(3).pdf [https://perma.cc/G4S9-DBAJ] (“Form C”).  To
meet the rights-required test, a user of the private-sector access provision necessa-
rily forfeits the usual ATI norm of neutrality with respect to requester identity and
motive. See Richard J. Peltz-Steele (ne´ Peltz), Joi Leonard & Amanda J. Andrews,
The Arkansas Proposal on Access to Court Records: Upgrading the Common Law with Elec-
tronic Freedom of Information Norms, 59 ARK. L. REV. 555, 705 (2010) (explicating
multistate norm).
118. PAIA, § 50(2) (S. Afr.).
119. Id. § 51(1)–(3).
120. Id. §§ 63-69.
121. Roling, supra note 100, at 21–22.
122. PAIA, § 63. (S. Afr.).
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information,123 breach of confidentiality obligation to a third party,124
risk to safety of person or property,125 legal privilege,126 and research in-
tegrity.127  Most exemptions are subject to a public-interest override when
disclosure would reveal illegality or “imminent and serious public safety or
environmental risk,” or the public interest in disclosure “clearly out-
weighs” the harm that the exemption seeks to avert.128
Following the example of its 1995 predecessor,129 PAIA was accompa-
nied by the formation of an independent civil society organization to sup-
port implementation, the Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC).130
Still today, ODAC vigorously seeks to effect social and economic justice
through PAIA and complementary whistleblower protection law.131
PAIA pronounced lofty aims, but the story on the ground is mixed.132
In an influential 2012 report, ODAC lamented an increasing trend toward
secrecy in both public and private sectors, accompanied by tactics of intim-
idation and a drive to commodify information.133  Calland opined in 2014
that it had yet to be proved whether transparency through PAIA and
sectoral laws, especially in extraction and construction, had “delivered real
accountability in corporate power.”134  Bentley and Calland blamed “inca-
pacity and incompetence rather than indifference or unwillingness” as the
“main drivers” of noncompliance.135  Constitutional ATI and PAIA have
not yet lived up to their promise, Bentley and Calland concluded, mostly
for three reasons that are familiar to access advocates in all parts of the
world: (1) complexity of process still excludes poor communities from us-
ing the system without the intermediation of civil society organizations;
(2) without an intermediate enforcement agent such as an information
commissioner, judicial enforcement is too costly, time consuming, and
complicated to make access practical, incentivizing authorities to deny ac-
cess excessively; and (3) the political establishment has not effectively
overthrown the culture of habitual secrecy.136
123. Id. § 64.
124. Id. § 65.
125. Id. §§ 66, 68.
126. Id. § 67.
127. Id. § 69.
128. Id. § 70.
129. Ngabirano, supra note 90, at 209.
130. Id. at 209–10.
131. Our History, OPEN DEMOCRACY ADVICE CTR. (May 12, 2013), https://www
.opendemocracy.org.za/index.php/who-we-are/our-history [https://perma.cc/
GJH6-B5G4].
132. Darch & Underwood, supra note 16, 237–42 (describing reports, espe-
cially by ODAC and South African History Archive).
133. DALE T. MCKINLEY, THE RIGHT TO KNOW, THE RIGHT TO LIVE: OPEN DATA
IN SOUTH AFRICA 7 (2012), https://opengovernmentafrica.files.wordpress.com/
2013/04/info-needs-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HRV-FHX3].
134. Calland, supra note 49, at 79.
135. Bentley & Calland, supra note 17, at 345.
136. Id. at 361.
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Compliance notwithstanding, ODAC’s stated priorities suggest PAIA’s
extant potential.  ODAC determined that human rights realization was
wanting for transparency in areas including housing, development plan-
ning, land and property disposition, social welfare, energy, environment,
and public spending.137  ODAC reported mixed success, and opportunity
for more work, with PAIA to investigate public-private partnerships; an-
ticorruption in procurement; private land ownership; utility pricing; medi-
cal malpractice in healthcare; environmental impact of industrial
production, utility infrastructure, and waste disposal; genetic modification
of organisms; and human displacements occasioned by the 2010 World
Cup.138  Indeed, Calland pointed to a continuing need for PAIA to prove
itself against the private sector, especially amid privatization in
healthcare.139
The 1996 constitution and 2000 PAIA exerted substantial influence in
the development of ATI at the continental level.  The “right to receive
information” was enumerated apart from the freedom of expression in the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter),140
which was developed in the early 1980s.  ATI was subsequently incorpo-
rated into various sectoral and regional African legal instruments.141  Con-
sidering the vast social and economic needs of people throughout Africa
relative to the number of aspirational international legal instruments,
Darch and Underwood suspected that “the freedom of information idea
137. McKinley, supra note 133, at 12–13.
138. Id. at 20–92.
139. Calland, supra note 49, at 79.
140. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights art. 99, Oct. 12, 1986,
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/TSZ4-X3ZC]; see Darch & Underwood, supra note 16, at 243.
141. Lasseko Phooko, supra note 16, at 179 (discussing sectoral instruments of
the South African Development Community regarding anti-corruption, mining,
fishery and forest management, wildlife conservation, transport and communica-
tion, and cultural information and sport); DRAFT MODEL LAW ON ACCESS TO INFOR-
MATION IN AFRICA, MEDIA INST. OF S. AFRICA, https://misaswaziland.com/draft-law-
on-access-to-information-in-africa/ [https://perma.cc/66ZN-66GD] (last visited
Jan. 19, 2018); e.g., African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance art.
19(2), Oct. 24, 2011, http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/charter-democ-
racy/aumincom_instr_charter_democracy_2007_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D5FP-J8NT]; African Charter on Statistics princ. 11, Feb 4, 2009 https://au.int/
sites/default/files/treaties/7794-treaty-0037_-_african_charter_on_statistics_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CM5V-UMAL] (transparency); African Charter on Values and
Principles of Public Service and Administration art. 66, Jan. 31, 2011, https://
au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7798-treaty-0042_-_african_charter_on_the_val
ues_and_principles_of_public_service_and_administration_e.pdf [https://perma
.cc/GT5U-UMQ7]; African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Cor-
ruption art. 99, Jan. 3, 2003, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7786-
treaty-0028_-_african_union_convention_on_preventing_and_combating_corrup
tion_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS28-3HL3]; Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (“Maputo Proto-
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may be under wider critical examination in African countries than the
data in the global surveys indicate.”142
At the national level, ATI is recognized in constitutional law in Africa
with more than the usual incidence.143  The constitutions of Africa run
the gamut in range of ATI recognition.  The most recent serious advance-
ment in ATI in African constitutional law came with the 2010 adoption of
a new constitution for Kenya, its second major reform since its indepen-
dence.144  The 2010 constitution declared, “(1) Every citizen has the right
of access to—(a) information held by the State; and (b) information held
by another person and required for the exercise or protection of any right
or fundamental freedom.”145  Two differences from the South African lan-
guage are noteworthy: first, vestment of the right in “citizen[s]” rather
than “[e]veryone”; second, the addition of “or fundamental freedom.”146
Kenya implemented its constitutional ATI provision with an ATI statute in
142. Darch & Underwood, supra note 16, at 243.
143. Emi MacLean, Right to Information and Access to Legal Information, Slide
Presentation to African Legal Information Institute, Nov. 8, 2012, at 9–10, https://
www.africanlii.org/sites/default/files/2.RTI%20and%20judicial%20decisions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D872-Z6DV] (finding ATI explicitly in 16 African constitutions,
and ATI as an aspect of the freedom of expression in 17 African constitutions).  As
of 2013, in an admittedly non-exhaustive survey, Ngabirano found ATI in the con-
stitutions of Cameroon, D.R. Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mo-
rocco, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.  Ngabirano,
supra note 90, at 194 n.19.
144. See Edwin Abuya, Realizing the Right of Access to Information in Kenya: What
Should Stakeholders Be on the Lookout For?, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN AFRICA: LAW,
CULTURE AND PRACTICE 215, 219–20 (Fatima Diallo & Richard Calland eds., 2013)
(describing ATI in the 2010 constitutional framework).
145. CONSTITUTION art. 35(1) (2010) (Kenya).  A second paragraph affords a
data protection-like right, “to the correction or deletion of untrue or misleading
information that affects the person,” and a third paragraph affirmatively compels
state publication of “any important information affecting the nation. Id. art. 35(2)-
(3).
146. A high court decision on ATI in government procurement, under the
new Kenyan law, is as yet unique, but tentatively indicates that these differences are
salient.  In Nairobi Law Monthly Co. v. Kenya Elec. Generating Co. (2013) Pet. No. 278
of 2011, ¶¶ 1–3 (H.C.K.) (Kenya), the court rejected a bid by a legal periodical
conducting an anti-corruption investigation to access government contracts with
six multinational companies for geothermal well drilling.  Prophylactically analyz-
ing the claim against the respondent as a private entity, cf. infra text accompanying
note 274, the court denied access.  Though initially receptive, Nairobi Law Monthly
Co., at ¶¶ 59–63, the court rejected the periodical’s media freedom claim as boot-
strapping the job of journalism to disproportionately constitutional significance,
id. at ¶¶ 69–70.  Regardless, the court denied access because the periodical was not
a “citizen” under the constitutional ATI provision, which aimed to exonerate per-
sonal rights. Id. at ¶¶ 76–82.  On both points, the Nairobi high court pointed to
U.S. precedents. See id. at ¶¶ 72–74 (quoting IAIN CURRIE & JOHAN DE WAAL, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 364–65, 694 (5th ed. 2005) (citing First Nat’l Bank of
Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978))); id. at ¶ 80 (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75
U.S. 168, 177 (1869) (construing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1)).
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2016; the statute echoes the language of the constitution in authorizing
horizontal application.147
Implementing the African Charter, the African Commission incorpo-
rated ATI into the 2002 Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expres-
sion in Africa, in which the commission also included the South African
approach to ATI in the private sector.148  However, in domestic legisla-
tion, African countries’ ATI laws run thin.149  To facilitate the recognition
of ATI in domestic law in Africa, the African Commission in 2013 adopted
a model ATI law (African Model Law).150  The product of a two-and-a-half
year drafting process coordinated by the Centre for Human Rights at the
University of Pretoria,151 the African Model Law represents a thorough
compilation of best practices in contemporary ATI law.152  The Pan-Afri-
can Parliament, the inter-governmental legislative body of the African
147. Access to Information Act, No. 31 of 2016, § 4(1) (Kenya).
148. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa art. IV
(Oct. 23, 2002), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/achpr/expressionfreedomdec.html
[https://perma.cc/6CWQ-D4FR].  Ten years after adoption of the declaration, a
commission resolution called for expansion of the ATI article and African recogni-
tion of International Right to Know Day, September 28.  African Commission Reso-
lution No. 222, Resolution to Modify the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression to Include Access to Information and Request for a Commemorative
Day on Freedom of Information, May 2, 2012, http://www.achpr.org/sessions/
51st/resolutions/222/ [https://perma.cc/T2UH-HKVU].  International Right to
Know Day was created at a conference of civil society organizations in Bulgaria in
2002.  Access to Information Programme (Bulgaria), 28 September International Right
to Know Day: The Idea, http://www.righttoknowday.net/en/idea/ [https://perma
.cc/35Z7-QR8F] (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
149. Darch & Underwood, supra note 16, at 207 (“The ‘veritable wave’ that
has been ‘sweeping the globe’ has passed the African continent almost completely
by . . . .” (footnote omitted)); MacLean, supra note 143, at 11 (listing 10 African
countries with “differing levels of protection” of ATI in 2012); A New Model Law on
Access to Information for Africa, FREEDOMINFO.ORG (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www
.freedominfo.org/2013/04/african-model-access-law-issued-by-rights-panel/
[https://perma.cc/UZ3Y-JAMA] (listing 11 of 54 countries with domestic ATI leg-
islation in 2013).  MacLean reported additional ATI mechanisms in sub-national
legislation, anti-corruption laws, archive laws, evidence and administrative codes,
civil and criminal procedural codes, and sectoral laws in health, environment, ex-
tractive industry regulation, and public finance.  MacLean, supra note 143, at 12.
150. AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS. [ACHPR], MODEL LAW ON AC-




151. A New Model Law on Access to Information for Africa, FREEDOMINFO.ORG
(Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.freedominfo.org/2013/04/african-model-access-law-
issued-by-rights-panel/ [https://perma.cc/3YC5-55E3].
152. Though in sum the African Model Law is exemplary, there remain
points worth quibbling over.  For example, the African Model Law might afford
respondent authorities too much latitude to refuse requests perceived to be “mani-
festly vexatious.” See African Model Law, supra note 150, at para. § 37; see also Ste-
phen Mutula & Justus M. Wamukoya, Public Sector Information Management in East
and Southern Africa: Implications for FOI, Democracy and Integrity in Government, 29
INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 333, 334 (2009) (discussing treatment of quasi-public bodies).
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Union, called on countries to adopt the African Model Law and to review
existing ATI laws to ensure compliance with pan-African norms.153
Also following the South African example, the African Model Law ex-
tends ATI to the private sector.  Apart from public and quasi-public bod-
ies, a “private body” is defined exhaustively to include natural persons,
businesses, or any other “juristic person,” such as an estate.154  ATI is af-
forded as against a private body when “the information may assist in the
exercise or protection of any right.”155  The express “general principles”
of the model law articulate the same right of ATI as against public, quasi-
public, and private bodies, to be effected “expeditiously and inexpen-
sively,” adding the rights-assistive requirement for only the latter class of
respondents.156  Commenters on the African Model Law divergently rated
private-sector accountability its “key strength,” especially regarding the en-
vironmental and health risks in extractive and other industries,157 and
wrung their hands over potential adverse impact on small business.158
The example of South African and the African Model Law is gaining
traction, if not universal embrace.159  Besides Kenya in 2016, four coun-
tries have adopted laws granting access to the records of private bodies.
Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Rwanda all adopted new ATI laws in 2013.
Sierra Leone grants access when “necessary for the enforcement or protec-
tion of any right”;160 South Sudan grants access when “necessary for the
153. Pan-African Parliament, Midrand Declaration on Press Freedom in Africa
(May 15, 2013), https://africacheck.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Midrand-
Declaration-on-Press-Freedom_FINAL_En-3-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/39JX-
N5N9].
154. African Model Law, supra note 150, para. § 1.
155. Id. para. § 12(1)(b).
156. Id. para. § 2(a)–(b).
157. Jemima V. Hartshorn, Can the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa
Fulfil Expectations? (Paper at European Consortium for Political Research Confer-
ence on Regulatory Governance, Barcelona 2014), at 10, 12, http://reggov2014
.ibei.org/bcn-14-papers/66-212.pdf [https://perma.cc/33E8-8HH2].  Hartshorn
worried, though, that lack of precise definitions in the African Model Law could
facilitate domestic legislative overrides that would be abused by authoritarian re-
gimes. Id. at 13.
158. Eduardo Bertoni & Gladisley Sa´nchez, Draft Model Law for African Union
States on Access to Information: Comments and Recommendations, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS
EN LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIO´NY ACCESO A LA INFORMACIO´N, http://www.palermo.edu/
cele/pdf/investigaciones/AU-Draft-Model-Law-CELE.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LKW3-82SN].  Bertoni and Sa´nchez wrote on behalf of the Centro de Estudios en
Libertad de Expresio´n y Acceso a la Informacio´n at the University of Palermo (Ar-
gentina) Law School.  Their analysis was informed by experience with the 2010
Model Inter-American Law on Access to Information, AG/Res. No. 2607 (XL-O/
10), which does not extend to the purely private sector.
159. For rejection of liberal private-body access, see Access to Information
Act, Act No. 13 of 2017, pt. 2, 5 (Malawi); Organic Law No. 2016-22 of Mar. 24,
2016, ch. 1 (Tunisia).
160. Right to Access Information Act, Law No. 2 of Oct. 31, 2013, pt. II.2(2)
(Sierra Leone).
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exercise or protection of any right.”161  Rwanda grants access to private
bodies “whose activities are in connection with public interest, human
rights and freedoms,”162 and further authorizes courts to order access to
private bodies when “required in the interest to preserve the life or liberty
of persons.”163  Tanzania adopted a new ATI law in 2016, and it extends
access to registered private companies “in possession of information which
is of significant public interest.”164
B. Judicial Construction of Access to Information in the Private Sector
When Calland advocated for ATI in the private sector in the new
South African constitutional regime of the late 1990s, and Roberts ad-
vanced the cause at the international level in 2001, there was yet little ex-
perience with the idea on the ground.  The courts allowed direct
enforcement action under the 1993 interim and 1996 constitutions during
the long wait for implementing legislation.165  Constitutional litigation by
its nature is uncommon and tends to tackle issues only in broad contours.
PAIA, not in force until 2001, represented a turning point at which ques-
tions of ATI implementation ripened for judicial review in lower courts
and set the common law interpretive machine in motion.  There is now a
body of case law with which to analyze the application of ATI to the private
sector.
From the case law, four observations may be derived: (1) “rights” and
“required” are construed loosely; (2) “reasonably required” analysis is fact-
intensive and susceptible of a wide range of factors; (3) courts at least early
on exhibited a greater comfort with ATI in the private sector in claims
invoking corrective justice than in claims invoking distributive justice; and
(4) despite that early inclination, later case law demonstrates that ATI in
the private sector holds tremendous potential for the attainment of
human rights at all levels, including collective rights.  Taking a wider view,
the takeaway from the case law is that even while struggling with the fine
points of application,166 South African courts have proven that ATI in the
private sector works.
1. Loose Construction of “Rights” and “Required”
The rights-required test of the 1996 constitution and the 2000 PAIA,
in its section 50—”any information that is held by another person [private
body] and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights”—
161. Right of Access to Information Act, 2013, Act No. 65, ch. I.4(4) (S.
Sudan).
162. Law No. 04/2013 of Aug. 2, 2013, art. 1, 13 (Rwanda).
163. Id. art. 14.
164. Access to Information Act, 2016, Law No. 6 of 2016, 2(2)(b)(ii) (Tanz.).
165. See Bentley & Calland, supra note 17, at 344 (“long and painstaking
process”).
166. See MENDEL, supra note 79, at 340 (“teething problems”).
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point to two key questions: (1) what rights are “any rights”?, and (2) when
is access “required,” or necessary?
Functionally, it is difficult to disentangle the two questions.  Both in-
quiries conjure a sliding scale that begins on the low end with mere desire
and the means to effectuate it, and runs to a high end of life and liberty,
and the necessity of survival.  Because of this interrelationship, a judicial
inquiry can be dynamic, allowing a weaker assertion of rights accompanied
by greater need, or inversely, a firm claim of right with more speculative
necessity.  Still, formally, it is helpful to remain mindful of the twofold
inquiry.
Because the 1993 interim constitution used the rights-required test
for ATI claims of public bodies, some case law from that time has been
carried over to inform PAIA section 50 construction.  The focus of this
article is PAIA construction, but interpretive guidance must begin with
these earlier-derived principles.  On the “rights” question, oft cited is the
pre-PAIA Cape Metropolitan Council v. Metro Inspection Services (Cape
Metro).167  The “required” question was examined in a line of pre-PAIA
cases, of which Van Huyssteen v. Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tour-
ism168 offers a useful example.
“Any rights” is expansive.  The term has been construed to embrace
both fundamental rights, such as fair trial,169 and common law rights,
such as claims in contract and tort.  That slope makes a stopping point
difficult to locate. Cape Metro involved a contract dispute between a coun-
cil and contract levy collector, Metro, amid allegations of fraud in claims
for commissions.170  Metro sought council records to clear its name.171
The court described Metro’s asserted rights for ATI purposes as (1) en-
forcing “a contractual or delictual claim for damages,” and (2) “constitu-
tional rights to equality or to protect its business reputation and good
167. Cape Metro. Council v. Metro Inspection Serv. W. Cape CC [2001]
ZASCA 56.
168. Van Huyssteen v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism 1996 (1) SA 283
(C) (High Ct. E. Cape Prov. Div. June 28, 1995), reprinted in 1 COMPENDIUM OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON MATTERS RELATED TO ENVIRONMENT: NATIONAL DECISIONS
59, 71 (1998) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM], http://www.right2info.org/resources/
publications/case-pdfs/south-africa_van-huyssteen-and-others-nno-v-minister-of-
environmental-affairs-and-tourism-and-others [https://perma.cc/ZT6V-E7P8].
169. E.g., Shabalala v. Attorney-Gen. of Transvaal (CCT23/94) [1995] ZACC
12, 1995 (12) BCLR 1593, 1996 (1) SA 725 (allowing ATI in police records to
protect right to fair trial).
170. Cape Metro. Council, [2001] ZASCA 56 at 5 para. 6.  Though decided in
2001, the court applied the language of the 1993 interim constitution. See id.
para. 26.
171. Constitutional administrative fairness would have afforded Metro an ex-
planation of the cancellation had the council used its state powers to cancel the
contract. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, para. § 24, later revised and recodified in S.
AFR. CONST., 1996, para. § 33.  But the court held that the state had canceled
under ordinary common law contract, Cape Metro. Council, [2001] ZASCA 56 at 20
para. 22, so Metro had to resort to constitutional ATI, S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST.,
1993, § 23, later revised and recodified in S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 32.
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/7
2018] AFRICAN INSPIRATION FOR U.S. FOIA REFORM 933
name.”172  Critically, invoking precedent, the court reaffirmed that
“‘rights’ in [ATI] in the interim Constitution included not only fundamen-
tal rights as set out in the . . . the interim Constitution”—and moreover,
that the same principle carried over into ATI in the 1996 constitution.173
Contract enforcement seemed sufficient to Metro’s purpose, though the
court pinned its decision on protection of Metro’s corporate
reputation.174
“Required” was part of the Cape Metro analysis too, and the court sig-
naled that the term is not strictly construed.  Softening the plain language,
the court opined, “Information can only be required for the exercise or
protection of a right if it will be of assistance in the exercise or protection
of the right.”175  The “assistance” approach made its way in the African
Model Law.176
A line of older cases, of which Van Huyssteen is exemplary, elaborated
on this construction by approaching “required” with the trusty common
law standby, reasonableness.177 Van Huyssteen involved land trustees seek-
ing access to environmental ministry records about a steel mill proposed
for construction on neighboring wetlands.  The trustees feared that the
authorities would approve the mill before an environmental inquiry was
concluded.178  In making a rezoning decision, the ministry was bound to
observe environmental conservation law,179 and some experts had as-
serted a pollution threat to a lagoon on the trust property.180  The court
concluded that the trustees “reasonably require[d]” access to ministry
records to be able to make their case, a showing that sufficed under the
constitutional ATI provision.181
The Van Huyssteen court derived “reasonably required” from an ear-
lier case in the line, Nortje v. Attorney General.182  In Nortje, accused persons
had won access to statements about their cases in police records.183  Advo-
cates in Nortje had argued over whether “required” meant “needs” or
172. Cape Metro. Council, [2001] ZASCA 56 at 22 para. 24.
173. Id. at 23 para. 27 (emphasis added) (citing Van Niekerk v. Pretoria City
Council 1997 (3) SA 839 (T) at 844A-846G).
174. Id. at 23–24 para. 29.  Neither the interim constitution nor the 1996 con-
stitution explicitly protects reputation, but reputational interest is sometimes for-
mulated as an aspect of human dignity or privacy.
175. Id. at 23 para. 28.
176. See supra notes 155–156 and accompanying text.
177. See generally Randy T. Austin, Better Off with the Reasonable Man Dead or the
Reasonable Man Did the Darndest Things, 1992 BYU L. REV. 479, 480–81.
178. Van Huyssteen, 1996 (1) SA 283 (C), reprinted in COMPENDIUM, supra note
168, at 62–63.
179. Id. at 65–70, 75 (reviewing environmental conservation law).
180. Id. at 73.
181. Id. at 71 (citing S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, para. § 23 (ATI)).
182. Nortje v. Attorney Gen. 1995 (2) SA 460 (C).
183. Van Huyssteen, 1996 (1) SA 283 (C), reprinted in COMPENDIUM, supra note
168, at 70 (citing Nortje, 1995 (2) SA 460 (C) at 474F–475A).
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“desires.”184  While desire might say too little, and need too much, the
Nortje court had concluded that witness statements “would ordinarily be
reasonably required by an accused person in order to prepare for trial in a
criminal prosecution,” criminal defense being a cognizable right “beyond
question.”185
2. Multiple Factors in “Reasonable” Necessity
The “reasonably required” standard of the Nortje-Van Huyssteen line of
cases ultimately took on the imprimatur of the Supreme Court of Appeal
(SCA) in construction of PAIA section 50.  Two SCA cases, in 2005 and
2006, have become seminal PAIA precedents, Clutchco v. Davis186 and
Unitas Hospital v. Van Wyk.187  Both cases involved straightforward attempts
to apply the PAIA to a private body.  The court acknowledged up front in
Clutchco: “In extending the fundamental right of access to information to
records held by private bodies, the Constitution and the statute have taken
a step unmatched in human rights jurisprudence.”188  Yet neither case
bore overtones of public accountability, and both requesters failed.  The
cases demonstrate the interrelationship between the strength of the rights
assertion and the urgency of the “required” assertion, as well as the highly
mutable nature of the “required” analysis.
In Clutchco, the “rights” claim was weak, and the court seemed to amp
up its demand on the “required” question.  Whether the former state
caused the latter is difficult to determine, because Clutchco was clouded by
the parallel operation of a sectoral disclosure statute. Clutchco arose out of
a struggle between father and son over ownership of the family com-
pany.189  The son, Davis, estranged from the company and a thirty-percent
shareholder, sought access to company books upon an asserted right to
value his shares for sale, after refusing a buy-out offer.190  The court as-
sumed arguendo that Davis’s right held water, though never analyzed it on
the merits.191  Suggesting that Davis’s personal reputation might be tied
up somehow with his financial valuation claim, the court quoted Cape
Metro approvingly with regard to reputation as a viable rights theory.192
Again, though, the “rights” basis never took center stage, as the court
found Davis’s case flawed on the “required” analysis.
184. Id. (citing Nortje, 1995 (2) SA 460 (C) at 474F-475A) (quotation marks
omitted).
185. Id. (citing Nortje, 1995 (2) SA 460 (C) at 474F-475A) (quotation marks
omitted).
186. Clutchco (Pty.) Ltd. v. Davis [2005] ZASCA 16, [2005] 2 All SA 225
(SCA), 2005 (3) SA 486 (SCA), ¶ 10.
187. Unitas Hosp. v. Van Wyk 2006 (4) SA 436.
188. Clutchco, [2005] ZASCA 16 at 7 para. 10.
189. Id. at 2–6 para. 2–9.
190. Id. at 3, 5, 7-8 para. 3, 7–8, 11.
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Cape Metro. Council, [2001] ZASCA 56).
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The “required” inquiry in Clutchco was clouded by the Companies Act,
which compelled disclosure of some facts from the company’s books, but
not the detailed information that Davis wanted.193  The court did not hold
the Companies Act to override PAIA, but because the legislature had ex-
pressly provided for disclosure of only selected data, the court demanded
of Davis a “substantial foundation” for his PAIA access.194  The court ex-
plained, “In enacting PAIA, Parliament could not have intended that the
books of a company, great or small, should be thrown open to members
on a whiff of impropriety or on the ground that relatively minor errors or
irregularities have occurred.”195
Citing the Nortje line of cases, Clutchco reaffirmed and elaborated on
the “reasonably required” test.196  Whereas “required” might span a range
from mere desire to assistive to indispensable, or “dire necessity” at the
extreme, the intended meaning must settle at “more than ‘useful’” and
shy of “ ‘essential.’”197  To articulate “required,” a requester must “ ‘lay a
proper foundation for why that document is reasonably “required” for the
exercise or protection of his or her rights.’”198  The court reasoned that
specificity in the request aids the argument on “necessity,” so the re-
quester’s explanation of how disclosure will protect the asserted right is
crucial.199  The court ultimately settled on “reasonably required in the cir-
cumstances [as] about as precise a formulation as can be achieved, pro-
vided that it is understood to connote a substantial advantage or an
element of need.”200  Because “an experienced accountant and auditor”
had failed to agree that disclosure would support Davis’s claim,201 so he
could not meet the “required” standard.202
The incompatibility of the Companies Act with PAIA section 50 be-
came clearer in a 2017 high court case, in which facts similar to Clutchco
played out again.  In Loest v. Gendac, a shareholder and involuntarily re-
moved director of a software engineering firm sought access to more in-
formation than the Companies Act provided, again claiming a right to
value his holdings.203  Loest had a better claim than Davis, because Loest
produced for the court a contract that allowed him to demand a fair valua-
193. Id. at 10–13 para. 14–16.
194. Id. at 13 para. 17; cf. Nova Prop. Grp. Holdings Ltd. v. Cobbett [2016]
ZASCA 63, 2016 (4) SA 317 (SCA) at 13–14 para. 20–21 (holding that by design of
Parliament, Companies Act provision affording unqualified public access to securi-
ties registers and directors registers operates in alternative to PAIA section access,
which is qualified by PAIA exemptions).
195. Clutchco, [2005] ZASCA 16 at 13 para. 17.
196. Id. at 12–13.
197. Id. at 8–10 para. 11 (quoting precedents, quotation marks omitted).
198. Id. at 8–9 para. 12.
199. Id. (quoting Cape Metro. Council, [2001] ZASCA 56).
200. Id. at 10 para. 13.
201. Id. at 13–14 para. 18.
202. Id.
203. Loest v. Gendac 2017 (4) SA 187 (GP) at 4-6 para. 6–12 (S. Afr.).
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tion of his shares.204  His rights claim therefore could rest cleanly on con-
tract enforcement.  For its part, the Companies Act did not preclude the
use of external remedies for disgruntled shareholders to extract valuation
data.205  However, pointing to Clutchco, the court again weighed the Com-
panies Act in the “required” analysis.206  The existence of remedies in the
Companies Act for disappointed shareholders weighed heavily against
Loest’s “required” claim under PAIA.207  The burden on the company to
have to defend in parallel processes and the attendant risk of abusive
claims led the court to reject Loest’s claim as not “required.”208
The breadth of the “required” analysis took on another dimension in
Unitas Hospital, in which the court held “that any attempt to determine its
meaning in the abstract would be a futile exercise[; rather,] the question
whether a particular record is ‘required’ for the exercise or protection of a
particular right is inextricably bound up with the facts of the matter.”209
Van Wyk’s husband died in intensive care at Unitas Hospital after receiv-
ing a surgery to treat Crohn’s disease.210  Van Wyk suspected malpractice
by the nursing staff, and moreover suspected that neglect in her husband’s
case had been documented in a hospital assessment report.211  Thus in
anticipation of a negligence claim, Van Wyk sought access to the report
under PAIA section 50.212  Initially Van Wyk did not specify a rights basis,
“[m]aybe because of her belief that the report was directly linked to the
death of her husband.”213  Pressed, she asserted that access would serve
“the exercise and protection of her right to claim damages.”214  The lower
court had accepted that theory, but the hang-up came with the “required”
analysis.  The parties disagreed over what the report would show.  The
lower court had reasoned that even if the report proved not to support a
negligence claim, Van Wyk would “know this early and therefore avoid
unnecessary litigation.”215
Reviewing precedents on “required,” including Nortje and Cape Metro,
the court noticed “reluctance . . . to make any positive statements. . . .  The
inclination is rather to define the expression in terms of what it does not
mean.”216  Desire, usefulness, and relevance are not sufficient.217  Essen-
204. Id. at 9–11 para. 18.
205. Id. at 19 para. 39.
206. Id. at 17, 20–21 para. 32, 40, 45–46.
207. See id. at 21 para. 45–46.
208. Id. at 21 para. 46.
209. Unitas Hosp. v. Van Wyk 2006 (4) SA 436 at 5 para. 6 (S. AFR.).
210. Id. at 5 para. 7.
211. Id. at 5 para. 8–9.
212. Id. at 4 para. 3.
213. Id. at 6 para. 11.
214. Id. at 6–7 para. 14.
215. Id. (quoting lower court opinion, quotation marks omitted).
216. Id. at 7 para. 16.
217. Id.
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tiality or necessity is not required.218  The court liked the “assistance” lan-
guage of Cape Metro, but opined that assistance alone would still fall
short.219  Then quoting the “reasonably required” conclusion of Clutchco,
the court took refuge in the facts of the case.220  The court observed that
were Van Wyk to initiate litigation with the hospital, the rules of discovery
would supersede PAIA, and the report would be subject to disclosure in
discovery.221
The heart of the matter, then, was whether PAIA section 50 may be
employed as a tool in pre-litigation discovery.222 Unitas Hospital is there-
fore similar to Clutchco in that the “required” analysis was clouded by the
operation of a parallel disclosure system.  Reiterating the angst seen in
Clutchco and Loest, the court evinced distaste for PAIA as an instrument of
“‘fishing expeditions.’”223  PAIA should be construed consistently with the
statutory deference to discovery that attaches after litigation is initiated,
the court concluded, denying access.224
However, the line that Unitas Hospital drew against pre-litigation dis-
covery was not bright.  The court disclaimed that “reliance on [section] 50
is automatically precluded merely because the information sought would
eventually become accessible under the rules of discovery.”225  The pros-
pect of litigation rather becomes a factor in the “required” analysis.  In an
earlier case in which the court properly awarded access, the requester re-
quired a report of a public body in order to determine whether the body
could be held responsible for property damage.226  If Van Wyk could have
made such a claim about the hospital report, she failed to do so at first,
and did so only upon an alleged inference later.227  Her claim was contra-
dicted by the affidavits of hospital officials, which asserted that the nursing
report was not related to Van Wyk’s husband in particular and would not
advance her case.228  Van Wyk therefore failed even to meet the “assis-
tance” threshold of Cape Metro, much less the substantiality demand of
Clutchco.229
218. Id.
219. Id. at 7–8 para. 16–17.
220. Id. at 7–8 para. 17–18.
221. Id. at 8 para. 19.  Jurisdictions vary in their treatment of ATI interaction
with discovery; there is no universal norm.  Unlike in South Africa, for example,
Arkansas law allows ATI and civil discovery to function in parallel. See generally
JOHN J. WATKINS, RICHARD J. PELTZ-STEELE & ROBERT E. STEINBUCH, THE ARKANSAS
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 455–86 (6th ed. 2017).
222. Unitas Hosp. v. Van Wyk 2006 (4) SA 436 at 8 para. 20 (S. Afr.).
223. Id. at 8 para. 21.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 9 para. 22.
226. Id. (discussing Van Niekerk v. Pretoria City Council 1997 (3) SA 839 (T)
(S. Afr.)).
227. Id. at 9 para. 23.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 10 para. 25.  Justice Cameron disagreed with the court opinion,
authored by Justice Brand, considering that a report on the efficacy of the nursing
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The Clutchco court’s recitation on “reasonably required” might have
been circularly unhelpful, but it made for lasting precedent, especially af-
ter a clarifying boost from Unitas Hospital. Unitas Hospital stressed the fact-
intensive nature of the inquiry, thus inviting development through further
challenges meaning to distinguish themselves on facts.  The fact-intensive,
reasonableness recitation of the “required” analysis reaffirmed the muta-
bility of the test, which can account for any number of factors, including:
the strength of the rights claim; factual evidence such as expert testimony
and documents, whether supporting or undermining the requester’s
claim; and the compatibility of the PAIA with other disclosure laws of
which the requester might avail, including parallel sectoral disclosure sys-
tems and subsequent litigation discovery.
3. Comfort with Corrective Justice
Clutchco became an influential precedent in two more cases that fol-
lowed quickly thereafter, Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) v.
African National Congress (ANC)230 in the high court and Claase v. Informa-
tion Officer of South African Airways (Pty.) Ltd.231 in the SCA, and later, For-
tuin v. Cobra Promotions CC232 in the high court. IDASA v. ANC and Claase
differ dramatically in their implication of public interest, yet considered
on that basis, their results are counter-intuitive.  Powerful public interests
in IDASA v. ANC were not enough to carry the day for access, while a
modest personal rights assertion in Claase revealed a court frustrated with
access wrongfully denied.  Together the cases suggest that at least early on,
courts were more comfortable affording section 50 access upon claims in
corrective justice than upon claims in distributive justice.
In IDASA v. ANC, civil society organizations proffered a host of rights
in a bid to access the contribution records of major political parties.  The
respondents were held private bodies for purpose of their fundraising, so
the ATI claim arose under PAIA section 50.233  Unlike Davis in Clutchco,
IDASA asserted manifold theories of rights grounded in the prolific 1996
constitution: democratic governance, free expression, free association,
“political choice,” “fair and regular elections,” democratic accountability
staff plainly would be relevant to Van Wyk’s negligence claim.  He therefore con-
cluded that the court construed “required” too stringently. Id. at 12–13 para.
36–39 (Cameron, J.A., dissenting).  Other justices formed the majority with Justice
Brand.  Justice Cloete explained that Van Wyk did not “require[ ]” the report be-
cause “she could comfortably do without it.” Id. at 18 para. 64 (Conradie, J.A.,
dissenting).
230. Inst. for Democracy in S. Afr. v. Afr. Nat’l Cong. (IDASA) [2005]
ZAWCHC 30, 2005 (5) SA 39 (C), [2005] 3 All SA 45 (C).  The institute is known
by the acronym “IDASA,” because it was previously called the Institute for Demo-
cratic Alternatives in South Africa.
231. Claase v. Info. Officer of S. Afr. Airways (Pty.) Ltd. [2006] SCA 163
(RSA) (S. Afr.).
232. Fortuin v. Cobra Promotions CC 2010 (5) SA 288 (ECP) (S. Afr.).
233. IDASA, [2005] ZAWCHC 30 at 10–11 para. 32.
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to localities, and administrative accountability.234  Sifting the theories to
discard the less justiciable and more attenuated, the court focused on the
“free[dom] to make political choices” under the 1996 constitution, includ-
ing party organization and the “right to free, fair and regular elections for
any [constitutional] legislative body.”235
The court reiterated the “reasonably required” language of Clutchco
and analyzed the asserted electoral rights on that basis.236  IDASA relied
on experts in political science to establish the importance of transparency
of political contributions and an appropriately informed and empowered
electorate.237  The court was unimpressed.  The experts pointed to cam-
paign transparency mechanisms in other countries, but none derived from
ATI legislation nor constitutional litigation.238  IDASA could not, then,
close the loop by explaining how contribution-record access would further
electoral rights.239  In the court’s assessment, IDASA advocated for “a gen-
eral principle or abstract right to disclosure,” but failed to articulate why
anyone “require[s] such information now.”240  Adding salt to the wound,
the court undid IDASA with its own words, quoting a position paper in
which the organization had touted the instant litigation as “ ‘part of a
broader campaign to lobby for regulation of private funding to political
parties.’”241  That IDASA itself viewed access as a policy question
dovetailed with the court’s observation that other countries establish trans-
parency by sectoral legislative choice242—to wit, the court referenced, U.S.
campaign finance regulation.243
If Davis was too self-absorbed in articulating his need to know in
Clutchco, and IDASA had its head too high in the clouds in articulating a
public interest in IDASA v. ANC, the claimants in Claase v. South African
Airways (SAA)244 and Fortuin v. Cobra Promotions CC245 found the sweet spot
in between.  Like Davis, Claase, in the SCA, and Fortuin, in the high court,
were individual claimants motivated by their own pecuniary interests.  But
their pitches resonated with the courts in a way IDASA’s had not.  La-
mented the Claase court, “[D]isregard of the aims of [PAIA] and the ab-
234. Id. at 13–14 para. 36 (citing S. AFR. CONST., 1996, para. 1(d), 16, 18,
19(1)–(2), 41(1)(c), 152(1)(a), 195(1)).
235. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, para. §§ 19(1)–(2).
236. IDASA, [2005] ZAWCHC 30 at 16 para. 42.
237. Id. at 17 para. 43.
238. Id. at 18 para. 45.
239. Id. at 19 para. 47.
240. Id. at 19 para. 48 (emphasis in original).
241. Id. at 19–20 para. 49 (quoting IDASA position paper).
242. Id. at 20–21 para. 51.
243. Id. at 23, para. 58 (quoting at length Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67–68
(1976), and referencing, but not citing, Publicity of Political Contributions Act of
1910 (later Federal Corrupt Practices Act), Pub L. No. 61-274, 36 Stat. 822 (effec-
tive June 25, 1910)).
244. Claase v. South African Airways [2006] SCA 163 (RSA) (S. Afr.).
245. Fortuin, 2010 (5) SA 288 (ECP).
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sence of common sense and reasonableness has resulted in this court
having to deal with a matter which should never have required
litigation.”246
Like Van Wyk, Claase essentially sought pre-litigation discovery.  The
case arose collaterally to a contract dispute between retired airline pilot
Claase and South African Airways (SAA), his former employer, over free
business-class tickets as a perk of his retirement plan.247  Claase suspected
he was being denied seats when they were available on selected flights, so
he sued under PAIA for data about one flight in particular.248  Articulat-
ing a right for section 50 purposes, Claase claimed simply enforcement of
his retirement contract.  The court opined that a requester must make a
prima facie showing of a cognizable right, even if the existence of the right
remains arguable.249  Claase met that burden with the terms of the con-
tract, which plainly entitled him to business class seats at no charge in
some circumstances.250  On the “required to exercise or protect” analysis,
the court had no trouble concluding that disclosure “would be decisive,”
“bring[ing] a short sharp end to the dispute”; there either had or had not
been available business-class seats.251  So irritated was the appellate court
with SAA—which had further muddied the case by earlier producing for
Claase a non-responsive record—that the court entered an award for puni-
tive costs.252
Like Clutchco, Fortuin arose from an ownership dispute over a small
business.  Collateral to a breach of contract claim, Fortuin sought access to
more detailed financial information about the business than he was enti-
tled to under corporate disclosure law.253  The respondent argued that
Fortuin was on “a mere ‘fishing expedition,’” suggestive of Unitas Hospital,
and that the PAIA should not be used to expand on corporate disclosure
law, suggestive of Clutchco.254  The court took its cue from Clutchco, finding
a parallel ATI law “a factor” in the “required” analysis and demanding “a
cogent foundation for the request.”255  Fortuin argued that he needed the
financial information to assess the value of his interest in the business as a
step toward choosing his remedy.256  Like the court in Claase, the Fortuin
court awarded access, finding overriding value in a pre-litigation use of
PAIA that might lay a claim to rest or encourage settlement.257
246. Claase, [2006] SCA 163 (RSA) at 2 para. 1.
247. Id. at 2–3 para. 2–3.
248. Id. at 3–4 para. 4.
249. Id. at 5–6 para. 8.
250. Id. at 4–5 para. 7.
251. Id. at 8 para. 9.
252. Id. at 7–8 para. 11.
253. Fortuin v. Cobra Promotions CC 2010 (5) SA 288 (ECP), at 1–2 para. 2
(S. Afr.).
254. Id. at 12 para. 24.
255. Id. at 14 para. 27.
256. Id. at 14 para. 28.
257. Id. at 14–15 para. 29–31.
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Both short opinions, Claase and Fortuin clarified PAIA operation in at
least three respects.  First, the decisions clearly reaffirmed that common
law contract enforcement is a sufficient “right” under section 50.  The pri-
vate-sector ATI test does say “any right” in PAIA, the 1996 South Africa
constitution, and the African Model Law—though the Kenyan adaptation
says “any right or fundamental freedom,” suggesting a loftier equation.258
Certainly one might bootstrap a contract claim with a constitutional invo-
cation, such as the right of access to the courts for the fair resolution of
disputes.259  But that was not necessary.  Claase prevailed on contract
alone, and Fortuin on his Clutchco-like valuation claim, neither with as-
serted dimension in human rights law.
Second, Claase and Fortuin successfully used PAIA for what was essen-
tially pre-litigation discovery, or more accurately, litigation-avoidance dis-
covery, in purely private disputes.  PAIA plainly may be used to advance
personal interests, as long as they pass muster under the rights-required
test; the exercise or protection of a personal right is itself sufficiently im-
bued with public interest to warrant the operation of PAIA.  In other
words, PAIA section 50 is principally a mechanism of corrective justice.
That ATI laws are often used by civil society organizations that have the
resources to litigate sometimes clouds the corrective role of ATI litigation,
especially when the respondent is a private body.  Moreover, Claase and
Fortuin confirmed that Unitas Hospital was to be taken seriously, that pre-
litigation discovery is not impermissible, as long as the claimant advances a
credible connection between right and disclosure.  A policy case can be
articulated against ATI use that might short-circuit litigation, but the
courts recognized overriding value in early and efficient dispute
resolution.
Third, the SCA’s frustration with the costs incurred in lengthy “pre-
trial litigation,” i.e., before the contract case even took shape, marked a
shift in tone from previous cases. Claase came only 20 months after
Clutchco.  In that time, the SCA moved from reverence for PAIA’s unprece-
dented scope to exhausted disappointment that appellate litigation is
needed to get a private respondent to follow the law.  At risk of reading
too much into this aspect of the case, the court’s frustration might high-
light both the difficulty of enforcing section 50 for individual claimants
against much better resourced respondents, and the court’s commitment
to routinize ATI in the private sector, notwithstanding objections predi-
cated on economic liberty. Fortuin came four years later still, maybe indi-
cating that the high courts got the message.
In sum, the divergence between IDASA, on the one hand, and Claase
and Fortuin, on the other hand, might demonstrate a preference in section
50 application for corrective over distributive justice, or at least an early
discomfort with distributive justice in the provincial high court.  In the
258. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
259. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, para. § 34.
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previous cases in which a claimant had asserted an individual financial
interest, Clutchco and Loest, their claims were derailed by a parallel disclo-
sure system in the Companies Act.  In Unitas Hospital, Van Wyk also as-
serted a financial interest by way of tort liability.  Ostensibly she too was
derailed by a parallel access system in litigation discovery, though, too, she
had pleaded poorly.  In other words, Unitas Hospital might have arisen on
bad facts;260 the proposition to take away from it might be that PAIA and
pre-litigation discovery are compatible when pleaded properly.  IDASA
failed in its claim against the political parties because it asserted only a
generalized interest in transparency as good public policy.  Thus looking
across the range of Clutchco, Unitas Hospital, Loest, IDASA, Claase, and For-
tuin, one consistent pattern emerges, that PAIA section 50 works better
upon credible claims in corrective justice.  That understanding is consis-
tent with section 50’s insistence on the assertion of a right as a prerequisite
for one private actor’s horizontal claim against another.  That approach
moreover reinforces ATI’s proper role as an enabler right, working not as
a right per se, but to facilitate attainment of a conventional right.
That said, there remains plenty of room to argue for PAIA application
in distributive justice.  Cases in the following part 4 regard use of PAIA in
pursuit of green rights.  There are indications of potential expansion on
that front where hot-button issues are concerned, such as the environ-
ment, development, and the revelation of truth about apartheid.261  Per-
haps like Van Wyk, IDASA pleaded poorly to make a sufficiently specific
case for distributive justice.  Or perhaps, from a legal realist perspective,
IDASA was not able to draw a win simply because all of the major political
parties, including the ANC, were lined up in opposition.  The water was
too choppy with political question for the court to risk a swim.  Or perhaps
IDASA was just too conventional a claim, tied to mundane blue rights in
political process, rather than sexy green rights in the contemporary fash-
ion.  It remains to be seen: a preference for corrective justice might prove
to be more an artifact of section 50 nascence than nature.
4. Pursuit of Green Rights
Whether PAIA section 50 works better in corrective justice by its na-
ture or just to date, a compelling question arises in whether and how sec-
tion 50 can be used to assert collective rights, or green rights.  Though not
all of the following PAIA cases arise under section 50, they all invite explo-
ration of the potential to use section 50 to enable green rights, namely in
relation to environmental protection, sustainable development, and the
260. See Calland, Exploring the Liberal Genealogy, supra note 49, at 84–85 (assess-
ing Van Wyk’s claim as too speculative).
261. See Roling, supra note 100, at 17–18 (quoting Unitas Hosp., 2006 (4) SA
436, at 13 para. 40 (“Other entities, like the listed public companies that dominate
the country’s economic production and distribution, though not ‘public bodies’
under PAIA, should be treated as more amenable to the statutory purpose of pro-
moting transparency, accountability and effective governance.”)).
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right to truth about apartheid.  And all of these cases resulted in favorable
rulings for requesters.
a. Environment and Public Health
In the vein of environmental protection and public health, a high
court case in 2005 merits mention for its private-sector implications, even
though it involved access to a public entity.  In Trustees for the Time Being of
Biowatch Trust v. Registrar: Genetic Resources,262 the court awarded presump-
tive access to civil society organization Biowatch to information in a public
registry of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).  From the private sec-
tor, biotechnology heavy-hitter Monsanto, along with two U.S. seed com-
panies doing business in South Africa, intervened as amici to resist
access.263  Worried about contamination of native maize by introduced
strains that are genetically modified to tolerate insecticides, Biowatch ini-
tially sought access under the 1996 constitution and sectoral environmen-
tal law.264  Over objections of respondents and corporate intervenors, the
court allowed the requests to carry over under PAIA.265  The corporate
intervenors argued vigorously for protection of information on grounds of
commercial confidentiality.266  Without ruling on the merits, the court al-
lowed that the registrar might subsequently deny access insofar as re-
quired to protect commercial confidentiality, “if he were honestly and
bona fide of the opinion that such a refusal is justified.”267
Biowatch simultaneously demonstrated PAIA’s vitality in access and its
safeguards to protect economic liberty in the private sector.  It is not diffi-
cult to imagine a PAIA request lodged directly against a company, as Mon-
santo must have realized.  The 1996 constitution guarantees a right to a
262. Trs. for Time Being of Biowatch Tr. v. Registrar: Genetic Res. [2005]
ZAGPHC 135 at 58–62 para. 69.
263. Id. at 3–4 para. 7–10.  ODAC intervened as amicus on behalf of Biowatch.
Id. at 4–5 para. 11.
264. Id. at 8–17 para. 17–21.
265. Id. at 38–40 para. 38.
266. Id. at 39–44 para. 39–40.
267. Id. at 44 para. 41.  A curious epilog played out in Biowatch over fees.
Generally South Africa follows the British rule on fee awards, but courts may ex-
cept to the American rule when a private “party litigates for public purposes and in
the public interest,” but loses, especially in constitutional litigation. IDASA, [2005]
ZAWCHC 30 at 23–35 para. 59–61.  In Biowatch, the court of first instance ordered
Biowatch to pay Monsanto’s fees—the seed companies declined to seek fees—be-
cause Biowatch’s requests had “compelled Monsanto [and intervenors] . . . to
come to court to protect their interests.  The issues were complex and the argu-
ments presented by them were of great assistance.” Id. at 58 para. 68.  In a later
disposition, the constitutional court recognized that as a result of the fee award,
“[a] shockwave appears to have swept through the public interest law community.”
Trs. for Time Being of Biowatch Tr. v. Registrar, Genetic Res. [2009] ZACC 14 at 3
para. 5.  Further recognizing that “Biowatch had been largely successful in its claim
against the government agencies, and . . . obtained information, whose release
Monsanto had strongly opposed,” the court reversed and charged Biowatch’s fees
to the public respondents. Id. at 3, 55 para. 4, 61.
37
Peltz-Steele: Access to Information in the Private Sector: African Inspiration
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
944 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 907
healthy environment, as well as environmental protection for future gen-
erations, “through reasonable legislative and other measures, that—
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conserva-
tion; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development.”268 Van Huyss-
teen demonstrated how administrative fairness269 bolsters environmental
legislation.  Thus PAIA can be used aggressively to investigate compro-
mised genetic integrity in native crops, which could have serious repercus-
sions for farmers who cannot afford to get into the GMO game—a serious
problem in the United States and globally.270  At the same time, the court
afforded deference to public officials to protect trade secrets and commer-
cially sensitive information, and the same PAIA exemptions are available
to private-sector respondents.271  A future clash on these competing posi-
tions is inevitable.
b. Sustainable Development
In the vein of sustainable development, a high court case in 2011 gar-
nered international attention, as it arose from South Africa’s hosting of
the 2010 FIFA World Cup of men’s soccer (football).  The World Cup is
the world’s premiere sporting event by many measures, and 2010 marked
the tournament’s first siting in Africa.  As a result, watchdogs from media
to academia were keen to analyze the game’s social and economic im-
pact.272  In M&G Media Ltd. v. 2010 FIFA World Cup Organising Commit-
tee,273 the Mail & Guardian (M&G), a Johannesburg-based weekly
newspaper, sought access to procurement records of the quasi-public or-
ganizing committee.  Most of the lengthy court opinion was preoccupied
with whether the respondent was a public or private body, owing to its
oddly hybrid constitution.  Ultimately, the court equivocated and opted
for an over-inclusive ruling: M&G was entitled to have its request fulfilled
either way.274
On the section 50 analysis, invoking Cape Metro, the court emphasized
the word “any” before “rights” in PAIA, indicating a legislative “intention
268. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, para. § 24.
269. Id. para. § 33.
270. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. White, No. 5:03-cv-02804-CLS (N.D. Ala. 2008)
(Memorandum Opinion, Dec. 16, 2005; Consent Judgment, July 5, 2006; Satisfac-
tion of Judgment, July 11, 2008). Compare Monsanto, Michael White Documentary:
“Seeding Fear” (July 24, 2015), https://monsanto.com/company/media/state
ments/seeding-fear-documentary/ [Permalink unavailable], with SEEDING FEAR
(Kings Point 2015), https://vimeo.com/117750603 [Permalink unavailable].
271. PAIA, para. §§ 64, 68, 69.
272. See, e.g., Richard J. Peltz-Steele & Jose A. Benavides, World Cup Dreaming:
Sporting Activism and the Incrementalist Advancement of Sexual Equality Through Associa-
tion Football, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 95, 107–12, 115 (2015) (discussing relationship of
men’s FIFA World Cup and host nations, including South Africa, and South Af-
rica’s investment wager in hosting).
273. M&G Media Ltd. v. 2010 FIFA World Cup Org. Comm. S. Afr. Ltd. 2011
(5) SA 163 (GSJ) at 1–2 para. 1–3.
274. Id. at 53 para. 163.
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to ensure . . . the broadest possible interpretation.”275  M&G relied on the
freedom of expression,276 within which the 1996 constitution specifically
articulates “freedom of the press and other media.”277  Relative to PAIA
section 50, the role of media in particular was “significant,” because it in-
voked “the duty as public watchdog, and the information they require in
order to discharge this obligation.”278  The court bolstered its view with
reference to media freedom in South Africa constitutional court prece-
dent, as well as European, United Kingdom, and Canadian case law.279
The court analogized to “the special position of journalists,” who are af-
forded latitude even in defense of falsehood in defamation law.280
On the “required” analysis, the court invoked Clutchco and Unitas Hos-
pital for a reasonableness approach,281 yet even then seemed to give M&G
a break at every turn.  Loosely, the court opined that “a record will be
‘required’ where there has been a demonstration of some connection be-
tween the requested information and the exercise or protection of the
right.”282  Furthermore generously to the media claimant, the court recog-
nized that a requester who does “not usually know [a record’s] con-
tents . . . cannot be expected to demonstrate a link between the record
and rights with any degree of detail or precision.”283  As if more words in
the mix would help, the court proffered “enhance and promote” rights to
define “required” to exercise or protect.  Accepting the fact-intensive ap-
proach of Unitas Hospital, the court regarded M&G as further advantaged
by the synchronous accountability function of media and PAIA, all the
more when the target of media investigation is “the most significant sport-
ing event in the world,” as opposed to the “corner fish-and-chips shop.”284
With that setup, the court had little difficulty concluding that M&G
access was “required” to investigate the possibility of “corruption, graft
and/or incompetence.”285  Though M&G seems not to have made a prima
facie showing of wrongdoing, the court was satisfied by committee pledges
that procurement processes “created opportunities for small businesses
and previously disadvantaged communities.”286  “[T]he public has a ‘right
to know’ that this in fact is so”;287 inversely, “[t]he consequences of inac-
curate reporting may be devastating.”288  The court moreover rejected “as
275. Id. at 107 para. 334.
276. Id. para. 337.
277. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 para. § 16(1)(a).
278. M&G Media, 2011 (5) SA 163 (GSJ) at 108 para. 338.
279. Id. para. 341.
280. Id. at 109 para. 343.
281. Id. at 114 para. 350–51.
282. Id. at 115 para. 352.
283. Id. at 115 para. 353.
284. Id. at 115–16 para. 355–56.
285. Id. at 117 para. 360.
286. Id. at 122–23 para. 383–85.
287. Id. at 123 para. 384.
288. Id. at 124 para. 387.
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without substance” the respondent’s resistance to disclosure on grounds of
competitive commercial exemption.289
From a bird’s eye view, M&G Media seems inconsistent with IDASA.
As alluded to above, it is impossible to know for sure why the results dif-
fered in two cases oriented in distributive justice.  It might be that the
Johannesburg high court in M&G, near the seat of the constitutional
court, was more willing to go out on a limb that the Cape high court in
IDASA, sitting in the legislative capital, was not.  Or it might have been that
M&G pleaded better than IDASA did.  M&G reduced its theoretical angst
over efficacy in development to the possibility of small business operators
losing out to fat cats.  In contrast, IDASA seemed unable to bring its theo-
retical claim of electoral integrity down to earth with any specific risk of
impact.  Or it might have been that the World Cup-and-development ques-
tion, which was a pervasive anxiety in South African social and political
spheres, was a terrain on which the Johannesburg high court felt comfort-
able, unlike the risk of judicial capital had the Cape court stepped out
against the ANC and other political parties.  More experience is needed to
see which case is the rule and which is the exception.
c. Post-Apartheid Truth
In the post-apartheid vein, another case about PAIA access in the pub-
lic sector merits mention, because in fact, the respondent was a private
body.  In Mittalsteel South Africa Ltd. v. Hlatshwayo,290 the court treated Mit-
talsteel as a public body under the quasi-public reach of the PAIA when
Hlatshwayo, a researcher, sought historical records dating from 1965 to
1973.  The steel company had been privatized by statute in 1989, but the
request sought records from the company’s prior lifecycle as state-con-
trolled “ISCOR, the largest steel producer in South Africa.”291  Because
Mittalsteel was compelled to respond as a public body, there was no need
for Hlatshwayo to satisfy the rights-required burden.
Though the court opinion made no mention of apartheid, that sub-
ject lay at the heart of Hlatshwayo’s query.  The graduate student was in-
vestigating historical labor conditions at ISCOR,292 including a troubling
mix of “racial despotism,” the “cheap black labour system,” and Afrikaner
nationalism in the “apartheid company state.”293  Such investigation dem-
289. Id. at 131–32 para. 408–13.
290. Mittalsteel S. Afr. Ltd. v. Hlatshwayo 2006 SCA 94 (RSA) at 17 para. 28.
291. Id. at 2 para. 1, 15–17 para. 23–27.
292. Id. at 2 para. 2.
293. Mondli S. Hlatshwayo, The Politics of Production and Forms of Worker
Response at the ISCOR Vanderbijlpark Works, 1965–1973, at 53 (2003) (unpub-
lished M.A. thesis, University of the Witwatersrand), available at Academia.edu,
https://www.academia.edu/24723973/THE_POLITICS_OF_PRODUCTION_
AND_FORMS_OF_WORKER_RESPONSE_AT_THE_ISCOR_VANDERBIJLPARK_
WORKS_1965-1973 [Permalink unavailable]; cf. infra note 296 and accompanying
text.
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onstrates the vital connection between ATI and the right to truth, which
motivates organizations such as the South African History Archive to be
zealous advocates and users of ATI.294  Though such application of PAIA
lacks prospective implications for the private sector, the prospect of access
to privatized entities in their historical guises vigorously enables the right
to truth.  In turn, revelation of truth about apartheid has relevance in ad-
dressing the dramatic and ongoing socio-economic inequalities that grip
South Africa today.  And while apartheid was a wrong of more naked mag-
nitude than the invidious oppression of Jim Crow’s America, a parallel
prospect for the use of ATI in historical access can readily be drawn to the
United States with implications for understanding racial and class strife
and formulating redressive strategies.
d. All of the Above
A second case of environmental protection litigation by a civil society
organization arose under section 50 and reached SCA decision in 2014.
Moreover, ArcelorMittal South Africa Ltd. v. Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance
(VEJA)295 reverberated with ramifications for both development and
apartheid truth.
VEJA sought historical and strategic environmental information from
steel producer Arcelor about its operations at Vanderbijlpark and Ver-
eeniging, focusing especially on waste disposal and particularly on one
“‘comprehensive strategy document.’”296  The court opened its opinion
with remarkable receptiveness to the collective rights dimension of VEJA’s
position:
First, the world, for obvious reasons, is becoming increasingly
ecologically sensitive.  Second, citizens in democracies around
the world are growing alert to the dangers of a culture of secrecy
and unresponsiveness, both in respect of governments and in re-
lation to corporations.  In South Africa, because of our past, the
latter aspect has increased significance.297
294. The South African History Archive in fact developed “Form C.” See supra
note 117.
295. Co. Sec’y, ArcelorMittal S. Afr. Ltd. v. Vaal Envtl. Justice Alliance
[(2014]) ZASCA 184, 2015 (1) SA 515 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
296. Id. 3–4 para. 2, 7–9 para. 9.  Apartheid-era labor practices in steel pro-
duction at Vanderbijlpark by an ArcelorMittal predecessor were the subject of the
researcher’s inquiry in Mittalsteel. See supra notes 290-293 and accompanying text.
The strategy document VEJA sought also was historical, if not going back as far as
apartheid, dating to 2000. ArcelorMittal, [(2014]) ZASCA 184, at 9 para. 17.  Grou-
sing and “dithering” in response to the request, Arcelor attorneys demanded that
VEJA explain “how the ‘alleged existence’ of the requested documentation came
to VEJA’s knowledge.” Id. at 8 para. 12, 32 para. 81.
297. ArcelorMittal, [(2014]) ZASCA 184, at 3 para. 1.
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The court furthermore characterized the case as an “entanglement”
of commercial development and environmental preservation, both consti-
tutional priorities that must be balanced.298
On the rights inquiry, the court allowed VEJA to rely on the constitu-
tional right to a healthy environment, as in Biowatch.299  The Rights-re-
quired analysis was tempered, as usual, by Clutchco and Unitas Hospital.300
Again notwithstanding the court’s distaste for generalized claims in dis-
tributive justice in IDASA, the SCA in ArcelorMittal recognized VEJA as a
“genuine advocate[ ] for environmental justice.”301  The court rejected an
array of Arcelor counterarguments, including that VEJA wished to situate
itself as a shadow regulatory authority;302 that VEJA should have availed
itself of access under sectoral environmental law rather than PAIA;303 and
that VEJA was on a fishing expedition.304
Unlike the motives of the requesters seeking financial disclosures in
excess of statutory terms in Clutchco and Fortuin,305 VEJA’s aims coincided
with the aim of environmental regulation, making PAIA complementary
rather than circumventive.306  Parallel accountability through environ-
mental regulation bolstered rather than undermined VEJA’s PAIA-rights
claim, because constitutional policy calls for “collaborative corporate gov-
ernance in relation to the environment.”307  In analyzing Arcelor’s as-
serted grounds for exemption, the court again referenced South African
history as the basis for deliberate constitutional imposition of horizontal-
rights assertions.308  The court concluded: “Corporations operating within
our borders, whether local or international, must be left in no doubt that
in relation to the environment in circumstances such as those under dis-
cussion, there is no room for secrecy and that constitutional values will be
enforced.”309
ArcelorMittal evidenced a strong commitment to ATI in the private sec-
tor and rattles any limitations on section 50 derived from prior cases.  In-
sofar as the “required” analysis demands a substantial foundation, VEJA
managed to get there by focusing its inquiry on waste disposal and an in-
ternal assessment known to exist.  Though collateral disclosure laws are
sometimes unamenable to parallel expansion through PAIA, the parallel
path is open when piling on is consistent with the laudable objectives of
298. Id. at 4–5 para. 3–4.
299. Id. at 20 para. 41 (quoting S. AFR. CONST., 1996, para. § 24).
300. Id. at 22 para. 49–50.
301. Id. at 23 para. 53.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 25 para. 58–59.
304. Id. at 26 para. 60.
305. See id. at 31–32 para. 80 (expressly distinguishing Clutchco).
306. Id. at 26–30 para. 60–74.
307. Id. at 23 para. 53, 29 para. 71, 30 para. 73–74, 32–33 para. 83.
308. Id. at 31 para. 78.
309. Id. at 32 para. 82.
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both systems.  If IDASA in the provincial court suggested a greater judicial
comfort with corrective justice, relative to distributive justice, the SCA’s
flattery of VEJA suggests that IDASA was oriented the wrong way.310  In the
end, little certainty can be attached to any conclusion besides the absolute
mutability of the rights-required analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION: OUT OF AFRICA311 AND HOME AGAIN312
As freedom of expression doctrine evolved in U.S. law, especially
against the backdrop of the civil rights movement in the latter half of the
twentieth century, it became obvious that free speech could not rationally
be cabined within its core purpose of political participation.313  In
Thomas I. Emerson’s landmark 1963 exposition of rationales for the free-
dom of expression, politics was only a part of one broader rationale, “so-
cial, including political, decision-making.”314  Alongside it were
“individual self-fulfillment,” the ascertainment of truth, and the social “bal-
ance between stability and change.”315  Bolstered by this perspective, the
freedom of expression was expanded to protect all “private speech” with
norms that powerfully disfavor content discriminatory regulation.  Social
interactions, art, and even the proposition of a commercial transaction all
came within the purview of the freedom of speech.316
The freedom of information did not transform similarly in the United
States.  There are many reasons why it did not follow a path in tandem
with its expression partner.  Among them, first, the freedom of expression
had an originalist underpinning, for which the British rule against prior
310. See Shannon Bosch, Note, IDASA v. ANC—An Opportunity Lost for Truly
Promoting Access to Information, 23 S. AFR. L.J. 615, 618–19 (2006) (finding IDASA v.
ANC inconsistent with purpose of PAIA).
311. Harvey M. Feinberg & Joseph B. Solodow, Out of Africa, 43 J. AFR. HIST.
255, 255 (2002) (dating phrase “out of Africa” to Ancient Greece and explaining
that “[i]t regularly signals a particular uniqueness in Africa—the capacity for
creating novelties—and conveys admiration thereof”); see also ISAK DINESEN (KAREN
BLIXEN), OUT OF AFRICA (1937); OUT OF AFRICA (Mirage Enters. & Universal
Pictures 1985).
312. THE ORIGINAL MOTHER GOOSE’S MELODY 21 (John Newberry ed., John
Munsell’s Sons ed. 1889) (c. 1760), https://books.google.com/books/about/The
_Original_Mother_Goose_s_Melody.html?id=5I5BAAAAYAAJ [Permalink
unavailable] (“Home again, home again”), quoted in BLADE RUNNER (Ladd Co. et
al. 1982).
313. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr., How Bork Recast Ideas in His Senate Testimony,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/21/us/how-bork-re
cast-ideas-in-his-senate-testimony.html [https://perma.cc/5LFL-TXEA] (referenc-
ing Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971)).
314. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 878 (1963).
315. Id. at 878–79.
316. E.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and of the Press, in THE HERITAGE
GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 406, 409–12 (David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding
eds., 2d ed. 2014).
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restraint was a progenitor.317  In contrast, the freedom of information
arose in response to trending secrecy in the public sector in the 20th cen-
tury.318  In that time frame, the freedom of information grew out of ad-
ministrative procedural law and ran contrary to the eighteenth-century
Framers’ de facto penchant for secrecy.319  Second, the freedom of expres-
sion was enshrined explicitly in the Constitution,320 so has been subject to
evolution by interpretation and progressivism.  In contrast, the freedom of
information is fixed in the text of the U.S. code,321 inclining courts to
defer to legislatures for reform.  Third, the freedom of expression has an
intrinsic value that resonates in the libertarian tradition of being left
alone, unless and until one causes harm to another.322  In contrast, the
freedom of information compels extrinsic engagement between requester
and respondent.323  Fourth, the freedom of expression usually has no pe-
cuniary cost, requiring only official tolerance.324  In contrast, the freedom
of information compels the respondent to expend resources to fulfill the
bargain.325
Finally, there is a matter of timing.  If the freedom of information was
to experience the sort of sea change that exploded the freedom of expres-
sion in the United States in the late twentieth century, it missed the win-
dow of the civil rights movement.  After September 11, 2001, the United
States entered a new era marked by interminable war abroad and divisive
politics at home: ingredients for suspicion and secrecy rather than coali-
tion-building and transparency.326  For these and other reasons, freedom
317. E.g., id. at 407; see BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ABRIDGED 463 (William
C. Sprague ed., 9th ed. 1915) (1899), https://books.google.com/books/about/
Blackstone_s_Commentaries.html?id=jAU9AAAAIAAJ [Permalink unavailable].
318. See HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW: LEGAL ACCESS TO
PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS 12–13 (1953).
319. RICHARD J. PELTZ-STEELE, THE LAW OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT 4, 126–28
(2012).
320. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
321. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552.
322. E.g., HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M.
KENNEDY ON LIBERTY 57 (2009) (highlighting libertarian theory of First
Amendment).
323. See CROSS, supra note 318, at 6 (contrasting role of ATI in modern society
with historic British common law, “when there were few contacts between govern-
ment and subject”).
324. See, e.g., Michael Carl Tschantz et al., On Modeling the Costs of Censor-
ship 3–4 (Sept. 10, 2014) (paper archived at Cornell University arXiv), https://
arxiv.org/pdf/1409.3211 [https://perma.cc/5XMN-WB3A] (describing “arms
race” precipitated by censorship, so inferring minimal costs in absence of
censorship).
325. See, e.g., David Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1123–31 (2017) (cataloging costs of federal FOIA
compliance and characterizing costs as tax burden).
326. See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, “Access to Records” Versus “Access to Evil”: Should
Disclosure Laws Consider Motives as Barrier to Records Release?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 559, 568–72 (2002) (describing impact of September 11 attacks on federal
transparency policy); see also Alasdair Roberts, Four Challenges to the Open Soci-
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of information in the United States did not follow the path to realization
in fundamental rights, as occurred in international and foreign law.
Americans have muddled through with a statutory right to ATI, rather
than a fundamental, or human, right.  As statutory ATI goes, FOIA is not
bad.327  Arguably excepting national security and Exemption 1,328 most of
the problems discussed by participants in the Shachoy Symposium were
process-oriented; FOIA does effectuate a policy of transparency in the big
picture.  But lack of recognition of ATI as a fundamental right inhibits its
efficacy as an enabler right and downplays its significance in maintaining
the balance of power that is required for democracy to thrive.  Emerson’s
rationales recognize that freedom of expression is about more than demo-
cratic participation.  The same is true for ATI.  Yet FOIA remains tethered
to the civil-political sphere.329  As Calland characterized FOIA, it was an ad
hoc solution to a civil rights problem of one time, in one space.330
True, even freedom of expression in America has not been well oper-
ationalized as a horizontal right.  Loyal to American libertarian ethos, U.S.
law tends to leave freedom of expression vis-a`-vis the private sector to the
law of obligations, more so than in Europe.331  However, the language of
freedom of expression at least is the language of human rights.  When
Americans talk about football players taking a knee, the question is framed
by the freedom of speech, even though the National Football League and
its franchises are private bodies.332  Debate surrounds whether and when
employees in the private sector, the public sector besides, can be
“#FiredForFacebook.”333  Freedom of contract, or economic liberty, is
viewed as in tension with free speech, because both are regarded as sacro-
ety, Keynote Address at the International Conference of Information Commission-
ers (Sept. 20, 2017), https://medium.com/@AlasdairRoberts/four-challenges-to-
the-open-society-92ae38489408 [https://perma.cc/RAQ9-4AYU] (lamenting
change in attitude toward freedom of information from progressivism in 1980s
and 1990s to “politics as usual” after September 11, 2001).
327. See generally Toby Mendel, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act: How It Measures Up Against International Standards and Other Laws, 21 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 465, 465–66 (2016) (finding FOIA “languish[ing]” relative to global
developments, but in step with its generation of ATI laws).
328. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
329. E.g., Roy Peled & Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Right to Information, 42
COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 357, 360 (2011) (deriving “right to information [as] pre-
condition for the exercise of procedural political rights” from James Madison).
330. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
331. This contrast goes a long way to explain the trans-Atlantic divide over
data protection, an area in which, to Europeans’ frustration, the American state
action doctrine precludes horizontal extrapolation from the Fourth Amendment.
See Peltz-Steele, Mind the Gap, supra note 85, at 162–65.
332. See, e.g., Mark A. Konkel & Diana R. Hamar, Trump v. the NFL: Can the
Players Sue the President? The Answer Isn’t So Simple, N.Y. ST. B.J. 17, 17 (Nov./Dec.
2017).
333. Christina Jaremus, #FiredForFacebook: The Case for Greater Management Dis-
cretion in Discipline or Discharge for Social Media Activity, 42 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 3
(2014–2015).
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sanct, regardless of the space in which conflict occurs.  Freedom of expres-
sion in the private sector therefore resonates in a way that freedom of
information does not—but should.334
Public access to the private sector is not foreign to the American ex-
perience.  Access to the private sector has been part of modern informa-
tion policy discussion in the United States since the privatization
movement of the Reagan Administration in the 1980s.335  The American
legal system features a number of sectoral affirmative disclosure regimes
applicable to private actors, often developed in response to crises.  In fi-
nancial regulation, Dodd-Frank, mentioned in part II, supra, was a legisla-
tive response to the financial crisis.336  The financial crisis and its fallout in
the housing sector continue to fuel debate over opening the books of the
nation’s private, but government-constituted, loan assistance authori-
ties.337  The Environmental Protection Agency runs the Toxic Release In-
ventory Program (TRI), a statutory response338 in part to the Union
Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India, and a subsequent toxic spill in West
Virginia.339  Legal reforms after September 11 were supposed to en-
courage the private sector to disclose critical infrastructure vulnerabilities
334. See, e.g., Alexa Capeloto, Transparency on Trial: A Legal Review of Public
Information Access in the Face of Privatization, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 19, 20 (2013)
(“[Thomas] Jefferson and even [Lyndon B.] Johnson could not have foreseen a
time when ‘the finances of the Union’ would become as deeply enmeshed with
private enterprise as they are today.”).
335. Id.
336. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.  Of course, Dodd-Frank
was not the first of its kind.  For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745, followed corporate accounting scandals including the
collapse of Enron.
337. See, e.g., Kelsey Ramirez, House Committee Considers Bill to Open Records at
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, HOUSING WIRE (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.hous-
ingwire.com/articles/39934-house-committee-considers-bill-to-open-records-to-
fannie-freddie [https://perma.cc/V678-A37M].
338. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728, §§ 300–330; Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101–508, 104 Stat. 1388–321, §§ 6601–6610 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-
13109).  TRI collects data from businesses in mining, utilities, electronics, manu-
facturing, publishing, and waste management about substances hazardous to
human health or the environment.  40 C.F.R. §§ 372.22, 372.45, 372.65.
339. Siraj, supra note 43, at 221 (numbering casualties at 7,000 dead and
65,000 injured); EPA, Learn About the TRI, https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-in-
ventory-tri-program/learn-about-toxics-release-inventory [https://perma.cc/U9V9-
ZRTU] (recalling 1984 tragedy in which toxic cloud of methyl isocyanate gas es-
caped Union Carbide Chemical plant, inflicting death and permanent disabilities).
U.S. legislators took notice when less than a year after Bhopal, a Union Carbide
facility in West Virginia experienced release of toxic gas, also a methyl isocyanate
derivative, injuring 135.  Ben A. Franklin, Toxic Cloud Leaks at Carbide Plant in West
Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/12/us/
toxic-cloud-leaks-at-carbide-plant-in-west-virginia.html [https://perma.cc/4WWN-
SLZM]. Cf. Richard J. Peltz-Steele, Accountability in the Private Sector: African Ambi-
tion for Right to Information in India, 25 RES. J. SOC. SCI. 203, 208–09 (2017) (describ-
ing TRI to contextualize analysis of Indian ATI law).
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to public authorities by exempting disclosure from public scrutiny.340  The
wisdom of that trade-off is debatable, but the private sector stands ready to
strike a similar bargain in cybersecurity.341  The Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act allows a data protection-like right of access to records
about oneself as against private education providers from K12 to univer-
sity.342  Pre-litigation discovery already enjoys limited recognition in civil
procedure in the United States as an antidote for information asymmetries
that impinge on access to justice.343
As a cross-sectoral device, FOIA performs poorly at access in the pri-
vate sector, even insofar as it might afford access indirectly, through public
contracting or to quasi-public bodies.344 An amendment to FOIA in 1974
defined “agency” to include “any . . . Government corporation, Govern-
ment controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive
branch of the Government . . . , or any independent regulatory agency.”345
340. See, e.g., Brett Stohs, Protecting the Homeland by Exemption: Why the Critical
Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 Will Degrade the Freedom of Information Act, 2002
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18; Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act Post-9/11: Balancing the Public’s Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection,
and Homeland Security, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 261, 285–304 (2003).
341. See David Inserra & Paul Rosenzweig, Cybersecurity Information Sharing: One
Step Toward U.S. Security, Prosperity, and Freedom in Cyberspace, BACKGROUNDER (Heri-
tage Found.), Apr. 1, 2014, at 1–2, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/
pdf/BG2899.pdf [Permalink unavailable].
342. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A).  The Obama Administration proposed
broader commercial data protection rights in an effort to smooth over trans-Atlan-
tic privacy negotiations, but only a voluntary program was implemented.  Doron S.
Goldstein, Megan Hardiman, Matthew R. Baker & Joshua A. Druckerman, Under-
standing the EU-US “Privacy Shield” Data Transfer Framework, J. INTERNET L. 1, 19
(2016); Peltz-Steele, The Pond Betwixt, supra note 84, at 19.
343. Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 43, 53–60 (2010) (discussing limited procedural mechanisms for
pre-litigation discovery, especially in state law, as needed correctives for would-be
plaintiff to meet pleading standards); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Informa-
tion, Access to Justice: The Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM 217, 220–22 (2007) (linking pre-litigation discovery and access to justice).
Anticipatory civil rights claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27, FED. R.
CIV. P. 27, sometimes look a lot like ATI demands, with facts comparable to those
in Unitas Hospital, but invariably fare poorly. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Con-
struction and Application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 27, 37 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 573, §§ 30, 32, 40
(originally published 2009).
344. See generally Pozen, supra note 325, at 1114–15, 1117 (citing inapplicabil-
ity of FOIA to private sector, in contrast with South African law, as evidence of
FOIA’s “regressive, corporate skew”).
345. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat 1561, § 3 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552(f)).  Amendment in 2016 liberalized access by codifying presumptive
openness in agency disclosure analysis.  FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L.
No. 114-185, 130 Stat. 538, § 1.  Though the substantive scope of access to procure-
ment and contracting was not changed, private business went on the defensive.
See, e.g., Jon W. Burd, Tracye Winfrey Howard & George E. Petel, New FOIA Improve-
ment Act Increases Necessity for Contractors to Create Robust FOIA Exemption Record, 2
PRATT’S GOV’T CONTRACTING L. REP. 304, 304–05 (2016); Doug Proxmire, New
FOIA Rules Open Contractors to More Risks of Disclosure, WASH. TECH. (Feb. 17, 2017),
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As intended, the change brought entities such as Amtrak and the U.S.
Postal Service into FOIA’s ambit.346  Legislative history indicated that Con-
gress intended a function or control test.347  However, examining the
1974 standard in case law, Craig Feiser found an unduly restrictive Su-
preme Court approach, limited to “official control”: (1) “creation or pos-
session by a federal agency,” and (2) “control . . . through both possession
and use in the agency’s official duties.”348  This limited reach for FOIA
falls well short of the funding, function, and power approaches that popu-
late state and foreign ATI laws today, and shorter still of the full range of
privatized bodies.349  As Matthew Bunker and Charles Davis observed,
“prisons, hospitals, schools, development agencies, film commissions, and
dog-racing tracks have been the focus of privatization efforts.”350  The
League of Women Voters added case studies of the privatization of librar-
ies and wastewater treatment, schools and prisons besides, at state and lo-
cal levels.351
Private prisons offered Roberts’s example of the need for ATI in the
private sector in 2001,352 and the example is no less paradigmatic today.
Private prisons impinge directly on the undisputedly fundamental right of
liberty, and they unquestionably employ a uniquely state power, the invol-
untary deprivation of liberty, all at public expense.  Thus, every ordinary
https://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2017/02/17/insights-proxmire-foia-
advice.aspx [https://perma.cc/8UJ6-K9UC].
346. Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis
of Public Access to Private Entities under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21, 32 (1999).
347. Id. at 57.
348. Id. at 45, 56.  Often cited to exemplify the Supreme Court approach is
Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980).  The case offers less than an ideal example,
though, as it involved scientific data gathered upon public grant support. Forsham,
445 U.S. at 171–76.  Nevertheless, official control became the test also in cases
concerning entities less than arm’s length from government.
349. Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public’s Right to Know: Debate Over Privatiza-
tion and Access to Government Information Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825,
836–60 (2000); Roberts, supra note 44, at 244–51; see also Diane Di Ianni, The Legal
Framework of Transparency and Accountability Within the Context of Privatization 7–11
(2011) (study for League of Women Voters) (electronic copy on file with author)
(examining public contracting broadly, including sport and transportation infra-
structure).  One ATI advocate compared privatization to a “‘cloaking device’ that
keeps . . . functions and expenditures from public view just as Star Trek’s evil
Klingon Empire used such a device to make its starship invisible.”  Mitchell W.
Pearlman, Looking for an Invisible Government (undated paper in online archive
of Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission), http://www.state.ct.us/foi/
Articles/Invisible%20Government.htm [https://perma.cc/W8UV-4U7Z], cited in
Di Ianni, supra, at 8.
350. Matthew D. Bunker & Charles N. Davis, Privatized Government Functions
and Freedom of Information: Public Accountability in an Age of Private Governance, 75
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 464, 464 (1998).
351. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE MIDLAND AREA, LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS NATIONAL STUDY ON PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES, ASSETS AND
FUNCTIONS 10-13 (2012), http://lwv-midland.org/files/privatization_summary03
0112.pdf [https://perma.cc/89F9-VE67].
352. Roberts, supra note 44, at 265–69.
48
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/7
2018] AFRICAN INSPIRATION FOR U.S. FOIA REFORM 955
trigger of quasi-public access seems pulled, yet FOIA’s official control test
cannot get there.  Accordingly, many access advocates have leveled their
sights on private prisons, the definitive treatment being Nicole
Ca´sarez’s.353  At one immigration detention facility on the Florida Ever-
glades in the 1980s and 1990s, “complaints of beatings or rape” were “al-
most routine,”354 and detainees were reportedly exposed to outdoor
temperatures exceeding 100 degrees for hours a day.355  In 1995, Ca´sarez
marveled that watchdog access to expose such conditions could turn on
whether the facility was managed directly by the government or by a pri-
vate contractor.356  Remarkably, despite congressional dithering,357 the
problem persists.  “America’s for-profit prison industry controls 126,000
Americans’ lives,” the Brennan Center For Justice reported in 2017.  “It’s a
$5 billion sector—one that encompasses the operation of 65% of the na-
tion’s immigration detention beds.”358  Opacity breeds maladministra-
tion,359 and maladministration means squandered public resources at
best, human rights abuses at worst.
However, to speak of access needs in particular service sectors is to
lose sight of the forest for the trees.  The South African ATI model is not
sectoral.  The innovation to be gleaned from Africa is not as much ATI vis-
a`-vis private bodies as the rejection of the public-private distinction.  In
conventional ATI, the public-private line defines the outer limit of ATI.
There is no good reason for so bright-line a rule.
Rather, the public-private line marks the boundary at which the pre-
sumption of access inverts.  The presumption of access to public informa-
tion—derived from common law, so pre-dating statutory ATI360—favors
the requester as citizen of the respondent democracy.  The respondent
bears the burden of producing the requested records for inspection or
justifying an exemption from disclosure.  When information in the private
sector is at issue, the respondent, unlike the government, enjoys counter-
vailing rights, such as privacy and economic liberty.  The presumption is
therefore of nondisclosure.  However, the requester should be entitled to
assert a right that overcomes the presumption.  That part of the equation
353. Nicole B. Ca´sarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal
Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249
(1995).
354. Alfonso Chardy, A Look Inside Krome: From Cold War Base to Immigrant De-
tention Facility, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 6, 2015, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/
local/immigration/article38001279.html [https://perma.cc/35ML-49VQ] (recal-
ling 1980s to 1990s).
355. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 97
(1991), cited in Ca´sarez, supra note 353, at 250.
356. Ca´sarez, supra note 353, at 251.
357. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
358. Eisen, supra note 82.
359. Andrea Headley & Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, The Privatization of Prisons
and its Impact on Transparency and Accountability in Relation to Maladministration, 1
INT’L J. HUMAN. SOC. SCI. & EDUC. 23, 30–32 (2014).
360. CROSS, supra note 318, at 22.
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is left out in American ATI, limited as it is by application in a civil-political
vein.  The African rights-required analysis allows for competing values to
be re-balanced.
The rights-required analysis in the United States need not look the
same as it does in South Africa.  Considering rights, the American consti-
tution is neither as expansive nor as abstract as the South African constitu-
tion.  American “rights” might be confined by the fundamental rights
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment361 or the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause.362  The Kenyan implementation of the African Model Law sug-
gests that approach.363  The “required” analysis in American law might be
construed more strictly, in the sense of strict-scrutiny narrow tailoring,
rather than the loose totality approach of South African necessity.  Over-
all, “required” might authorize access only to publicly traded companies,
whose regulatory framework already signals a policy calculation that dif-
fuse shareholder interests justify greater public scrutiny.364  ATI in the pri-
vate sector might be implemented through the financial regulatory system,
rather than as an overgrowth of public administrative law.
Or we might be bold.
The United States continues to suffer strife of racial and class divi-
sion—much of it the slow burn of deep wounds that erupted once into
civil war and never healed in the faltering era of Reconstruction; some of
it the yawning divide of haves and have-nots that seems to have consigned
the American dream to fading reverie.365  Privatization periodically waxes
in fashion, as seems to be the present lead of the Department of Educa-
tion.366  Meanwhile acute disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill367 and chronic conditions such as climate change remind us of the
361. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see James W. Ely, Jr., Due Process Clause, in
THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 506, 509–10 (David F. Forte & Mat-
thew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014) (“incorporation doctrine”); see also Developments in
the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248,
1266–78 (examining confusion over state action doctrine in Fourteenth Amend-
ment civil rights jurisprudence).
362. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see David F. Forte & Ronald D. Rotunda,
Privileges and Immunities Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 349,
352-53 (David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014).
363. See text accompanying supra note 258.
364. Cf. supra note 261.
365. E.g., Roger C. Altman, Commentary: The American Dream is Dead, and Voters
Are Angry, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 2017, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opin-
ion/commentary/ct-angry-voters-trump-elections-20171027-story.html [https://
perma.cc/5P2R-8VXN].
366. See, e.g., Leslie Postal, Beth Kassab & Annie Martin, Schools Without Rules:
An Orlando Sentinel Investigation, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 17, 2017, http://www.or-
landosentinel.com/features/education/os-schools-without-rules-story-gallery-story-
gallery.html [https://perma.cc/W2L3-6GUX] (examining “nearly $1 billion” in
state scholarships distributed to private schools in one year).
367. E.g., Lynn M. Grattan et al., The Early Psychological Impacts of the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill on Florida and Alabama Communities, 119 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 838
(2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3114820/ [https://per
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inevitable interdependence of commerce, the environment, and human
life.  Americans are entitled to truth, opportunity, and prosperity no less
than the people of Kenya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, South Af-
rica, and Tanzania.  Americans are due a restoration of democratic power
in balance with contemporary governmental and corporate power—no
less than was needed to re-balance the scales with the administrative state
in 1966.
African ATI is bold.
FOIA once was bold, but no longer is.  Let’s blow it up.
ma.cc/7XWT-T5XV] (assessing intangible damages); Lawrence C. Smith, Jr., L.
Murphy Smith & Paul A. Ashcroft, Analysis of Environmental and Economic Damages
from British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 74 ALBANY L. REV. 563, 576 (2010/
2011) (estimating economic damages at $36.9 billion); see also Renuka Rayasam,
America Can’t Trust Public Water, so It’s Turning to Private Companies, QUARTZ, Oct. 25,
2016, https://qz.com/817913/america-cant-trust-public-water-so-its-turning-to-pri
vate-companies/ [https://perma.cc/V7EF-PS5X] (describing trending privatiza-
tion of water provision since Flint, Michigan, disaster).
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